Hāhā-uri, hāhā-tea

Māori Involvement in State Care 1950-1999

Chapter 7: Māori staff working in the State Care system

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# Chapter Seven Māori staff working in the State Care system

Te korokoro o Te Parata[[1]](#footnote-2)

## Summary

The metaphor of a machine is used to describe the state as active and productive. The state machine is institutionally racist and serves to marginalise Māori and maintain power. The experiences of Māori staff have to been seen through the lens of institutional racism in order to understand their experiences fully (p. 269).

It is difficult to determine the number of Māori staff in the state care sector, and how this has changed over time. Despite recommendations, no consistent definition or means of collecting or storing this information was developed for this period (p. 270).

Māori were drawn to the public service in roles where they work directly with whānau (p. 269).

There has been a shortage of skilled staff, particularly of Māori staff, in the state care sector reported since the 1950’s (p. 270).

Being marginalised in the workforce creates challenges for Māori, particularly when they are isolated within Departments and institutions (p. 274).

The impact of being marginalised means it has been very difficult for Māori to drive change within the sector (p. 274).

The impact of employment practices and conditions within the state sector has influenced Māori staff experiences in the state system (p. 278).

The insistence on academic qualifications for many positions in the Department effectively locked the gate against Māori applicants (p. 278).

While there was a commitment to recruiting Māori staff in the 1980’s and 1990’s, recruitment tended to focus on junior entry level positions. Policies and procedures were not in place across the public service to build strategic Māori capability (p. 278).

Māori were over-represented in clerical, voluntary and care giver positions ensuring they had little to no authority or ability to influence the system (p. 276).

The lack of Māori within the Department and the distribution of Māori staff through pepper potting, left Māori unable to collectivise in the workplace. (p. 300).

Māori staff have been marginalised through inequitable employment practices and lack of opportunities to develop Māori leadership (p. 280).

There was no recognised approach to developing Māori leadership and career pathways for Māori public servants (p. 282).

The lack of Māori in State Care leadership positions was concerning (p. 282).

Marginalisation in the workforce limited the ability of Māori leaders to influence and make changes within the state sector (p. 282).

The constantly changing state has impacted on Māori staff resulting in redundancy, staff constantly changing jobs and uncertainty of employment (p. 284).

There was a disproportionate loss of Māori staff when restructuring of a department, particularly when regional offices with a high percentage of Māori staff were closed down (p. 284).

Māori staff worked within institutions that were developed under inherited colonial structures and systems which were recognised as being institutionally racist (p. 286).

In 1985 the DSW was first recognised as institutionally racist, described as a typical, hierarchical bureaucracy, the rules of which reflected the values of the dominant Pākehā society (p. 286).

The department promoted a tokenistic and diluted form of biculturalism. Pākehā retained control and were reluctant to share power with Māori or hand power over to whānau (p. 287).

Early western models of psychiatric/welfare care were marked by large institutions with a limited range of treatments. Residential institutions were institutionally racist. There was a lack of state monitoring of residential institutions, the administration of the system was mono-racial, and staff were often untrained and unsupervised (p. 288).

Psychiatric residences were institutionally racist. There was an absence of a Māori perspective during assessment, services were gatekept by Pākehā and staff were inadequately trained (p. 291).

Special schools were institutionally racist. There was a lack of culturally appropriate programmes for Māori, staff were in a position of power in relation to whānau Māori, and there were no formal or informal grievance procedures for Māori children and their whānau (p. 291).

Māori welfare officers had the flexibility to respond to whānau need, however they still worked within the structures of the state (p. 295).

The social work profession has contributed to the creation, expansion, and adaptation of State Care (p. 297).

Eurocentrism dominated the profession of social work and social work practices (p. 297).

The State Care sector was hierarchical and riddled with power dynamics that inhibited care (p. 298).

Staff practices and roles within the Department were manualised, with little consideration for Māori (p. 298).

Roopū teams were introduced at CYFS with the specific goal of supporting Māori social workers and improving services for Māori children and their whānau. Little to no resources were provided for Māori supervision or leadership to keep Roopū teams supported and thriving (p. 300)

Māori volunteers within local communities wanted to make a difference for Māori children (p. 302).

The sector was heavily reliant on voluntary staff. Many volunteers were marginalised, exploited and undervalued in their work (p. 302).

There is evidence of under provision of appropriate training for Māori across the State Care sector (p. 303).

On-going appropriate in-service training was lacking for Māori, including clinical supervision. This has limited the development of Māori social work and critical Māori programmes in care and protection (p. 304).

The State Care sector was under resourced by the Crown (p. 308). The lack of bicultural capability and capacity was a serious issue that was apparent in multiple sources over several decades (p. 308).

The lack of Māori capacity within the system has meant Māori staff have often had unrealistic expectations placed upon them (p. 308).

High workload, stress and under resourcing resulted in constant staff turnover (p. 308).

The top-down approach evident in Aotearoa New Zealand’s policy development between the 1950 and 1999 has had significant impact on the Māori staff (p. 310).

The emphasis on technical qualification effectively disqualified most Māori staff from policy making roles (p. 310).

Top-down policy development permitted state appropriation of Māori cultural practices to support Eurocentric policy construction and inappropriate policies and interventions (p. 310).

Originating from Māori practice, the Family Group Conferencing (FGC) intended as a process of whānau decision making was co-opted under legislation. FGC practices were inconsistent, resourcing was inadequate, and CYFS maintained decision making powers effectively nullifying whānau self- determination (p. 312).

The lack of support to build indigenous research evidence in the State Care sector has had a significant impact on Māori staff (p. 313).

The fact that there is so little evidence of Māori staff experiences in the care sector prior to 1999 is an indication of the value the state placed on Māori staff in the sector, and the lack of opportunities for Māori practitioners to research and publish during the period (p. 313).

Māori social workers in government organisations report very few examples of organisational support for Māori practices (p. 318).

Māori staff experienced feelings of conflict. Their attitude towards clients/whānau was often judged as being overly involved and unprofessional from a Eurocentric position (p. 320).

Māori public servants had to manage the dual expectations of the Māori community and the public sector (p. 320).

Māori public servants were often perceived by their communities as ‘monitors for the state’ and could be treated as ‘agents of the state’ by their community (p. 320).

Burnout and high turnover of Māori social workers resulted in a drain of Māori knowledge and capability from the sector (p. 321).

Māori staff reported being constantly at odds with the values and beliefs that were privileged and accepted as ‘normal’ (p. 319).

Māori staff reported having to leave their ‘Māoriness’ at home and conform to the Pākehā hegemony within the workplace (p. 319).

While Māori staff have worked within this context, they have developed their own practices and theoretical approaches. Māori staff voiced their concerns to senior managers and were resistant to changes that they believed did not reflect the intention of te Tiriti o Waitangi / the Treaty of Waitangi or Puao-te-Ata-Tū. Māori staff described themselves as the squeaky wheel in the machine, realising that their resistance could compromise their opportunities and ambitions within the sector (p. 327).

## Introduction

This chapter reviews research and literature concerning the experiences of Māori staff working within the State Care sector. As outlined in previous chapters, the abuse that occurred within State Care is the responsibility of the whole settler state rather than a single department within the government.

For the purpose of this chapter, the metaphor of the ‘state as a machine’ will be used to understand how different aspects of the state worked together to create a working environment for Māori staff frequently labelled as ‘institutionally racist, marginalising and tokenistic’ during the 1950-1990 period. Eighteenth century philosopher, Kant, argued that one could only imagine the state ‘symbolically’ since it was beyond direct perception. He gave an example of the state referred to ‘as a mere machine’ (as cited in Guyer, 2000). The interpretation of the state as a machine, associated with nineteenth century sociologist Max Weber, has proved to be an enduring political theory recognising the state as ‘active and mechanistic’.

The vernacular is well established within New Zealand Government. For example, the Public Service Commission describes the ‘machinery of government’ as ‘the structures of government and how they work.’ ‘It includes the changing set of organisations within government, their functions and governance arrangements, and how they work together to deliver results for Ministers and the public’ (Public Service Commission, 2021). Using the metaphor of a machine enables the reader to view the state as active and productive and consider how the ‘machinery of government’ influenced those who worked within the State Care system during the research period 1950-1999.

This section explores the experiences of Māori staff within the State Care sector and therefore working within state created contexts, the features of which are often taken for granted as part of the ‘machinery of government’, however, they have significant implications for Māori staff.

It is important to note that Māori staff members may be implicated for condoning and/or conducting abuse that occurred within the system. Māori and non-Māori staff alike may have been abusers of tamariki Māori and vulnerable adults whilst they worked within the State Care sector. There is evidence of Māori staff bullying and physically assaulting children and youth in residences (Ministry of Social Development, 2009; Dalley, 1998a).

This chapter describes the impact of the sector on, and the marginalisation of Māori staff, as well as their experience working for the settler state in departments designed to assimilate and colonise Māori. Document analysis demonstrated the inadequate action and deliberate inaction by the settler State Care system to address issues impacting on Māori staff and their ability to influence the machinery of government, for the best interests of whānau. Despite this, evidence also highlights the agency and resistance of Māori staff, including the development of kaupapa Māori approaches to better meet the needs of tamariki Māori and their whānau.

### State ambivalence towards Māori staff working within the State Care sector

Workforce research relating to Māori employees’ perceptions of their workplace is scarce (Kuntz, Naswall, Beckingsale, & Macfarlane, 2014). This is unsurprising given the sparsity of research focussing on the values of indigenous people in workplaces and organisations internationally (Haar & Brougham, 2013). Analysis of Māori staff experiences within the state sector indicates that many Māori are drawn into service positions with the public service, where they work directly with whānau. Across government data demonstrates that most Māori were employed in service delivery ministries during the period of 1950-1999 (State Services Commission, 1999).

A survey of public servants in the late 1990s demonstrated that Māori staff were disproportionately spread across the five large service delivery departments. These departments employed 58% of all public service staff. Excluding Te Puni Kōkiri, the policy ministries employed 11% of all public service staff and only 5% of Māori.

Māori made up 7% of the senior management group. Social Workers made up 18% of the skill shortage vacancies in the year June 1998-1999 (State Services Commission, 1999). However, Māori ethnicity data was only reported for approximately 80% of staff across the public service and there was a wide variation in the representation of Māori staff across departments.

In 1998, Wira Gardiner and Hekia Parata undertook a ‘Māori Recruitment and Retention Project’ commissioned by the Chief Executives Forum to examine Māori recruitment and retention in the public service. They noted:

There is no clear central database of Māori public servants; there is no agreed policy to identify Māori public servants, and consequently no consistent definition or means of collecting or storing this information. The process for community with Māori public servants is unwieldy, time consuming and haphazard (Gardiner & Parata, 1998, p. 8).

### The challenges of quantifying Māori staff in the state sector

Determining the number of Māori staff and how it changes over time is difficult. Prior to 2000, staff data, particularly ethnicity, within the Children and Young Persons Service (CYPS), is irregular and unreliable. From 1930-1987 staff details were recorded on 30,000 cards, much like library cards (very few of which have been digitised), currently held at Archives NZ. The information is often incomplete with few demographics and no ethnicity details. It is possible to inspect the cards, but the time and resources required is prohibitive. The National Library holds the ‘List of persons employed by the Public Service’, commonly referred to as the ‘stud books’, however, although they provide total numbers in occupations and locations, they do not contain ethnicity. Between 2000-2005, staff data is more comprehensive, and between 2006-2017 it accurately identifies, ethnicity, position, gender and region.

In September 1978, a joint State Service Commission (SSC), Māori Affairs and Public Service Association working party on race relations was convened to develop positive measures to eliminate discrimination in the public service. The recommendations focussed on improving the effectiveness of services to Māori and Pasifika peoples. At that time, there was no reliable information about the ethnic composition of government departments; different cultural values and needs had not been given due weight, and the public service did not adequately reflect the diverse composition of society (Workman, 2017, p. 167).

In 1988 Puao-te-Ata-Tū reported on staff within the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) for the year ending 1986:

There is a network of 73 Social Welfare offices throughout the country, staffed by over 6,000 people. The Department is currently paying over one million social security benefits each fortnight. Each year it processes over 300,000 new applications for benefits, as well as reviewing many of the existing benefits… The Department provides a social work service for individuals and families under stress, with particular emphasis on the care and control of children. There are currently about 10,000 children either under guardianship or supervision by the Department. It also operates a wide variety of social work programmes, ranging from full-time residential care to preventive work with families and community groups (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986).

Puao-te-Ata-Tū did not identify what proportion of the 6,000 staff were Māori. It is likely they would have not been able to do this at the time as the DSW did not collect ethnicity data. In 1983, the Women Against Racism Action Group (WARAG) 1984 report noted the State Services Commission had recommended that government departments gather ethnicity data of their staff, but that this had not yet been undertaken.

## The machinery of institutional racism

In Aotearoa New Zealand the term ‘institutional racism’ first entered public discourse in the 1970s and most notably found expression in several government reports produced during the 1980s including; the WARAG, 1984, The Māori Advisory Report (MAU, 1985), Puao-te-Ata-Tū (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) and Jackson’s (1987, 1988) seminal work on Māori in the criminal justice system. Institutional racism has been defined as ‘the structural ways in which ethnic-minority citizens were systematically disadvantaged by social institutions’, such as the State Care system (Spoonley, 1993).

During the 1980s, increasing concerns about the treatment of Māori within the care sector initiated internal investigations by the DSW. In November 1984, ‘Institutional Racism in the Department of Social Welfare, Tamaki Makaurau’ was released. Compiled by a group of nine women employed within the DSW, called the Women Against Racism Action Group (WARAG), the report provided evidence of racism in the department.

Around this time (1985), the Māori Advisory Unit (MAU) from the DSW, was commissioned by the Director General to report on Māori perceptions of the DSW and its capacity to meet the needs of the Māori people via service delivery. Three advisers were seconded from the Auckland District Māori Council, chaired by Dr Ranginui Walker, to the

Māori Advisory Unit in the DSW: Malcolm Peri, Moana Herewini, and Rangitinia Wilson. Their roles were to advise on Māori needs and the concerns affecting Māori. In addition, to introduce another dimension to the DSW, that of caring and sharing (manaaki me to aroha) (MAU, 1985, p. 3). The MAU report evidence was based on views and comments expressed by the wider Māori community including Māori voluntary organisations, voluntary workers, Māori consumers, as well as Māori DSW clients and staff from the Auckland Region. The report concluded the DSW was institutionally racist, ‘it was a typical, hierarchical bureaucracy, the rules of which reflected the values of the dominant Pākehā society’ (MAU, 1985 p. 11).

Both of these reports, which served as precursors to Puao-te-Ata-Tū, described practices within the department that marginalised Māori staff and clients as institutionally racist and concluded that institutional racism existed throughout the DSW in Tamaki Makaurau/Auckland. The MAU report maintained: ‘the institutional framework of the Department, staffing, training, legislation and policies reflects a relentlessly Pākehā view of society which oppressively and systemically discriminates against the interest of consumers and staff who are Māori and Pacific people’ (1985, p. 1). While the WARAG review focussed on the DSW of Tamaki Makaurau/ Auckland, the findings had implications for the DSW as a whole.

WARAG (1984) evidenced institutional racism in the DSW in four areas.

“You had child health professionals who had an enormous self- confidence in their ability to tell when children are being abused, and their answer to that – in all instances - is to take children out of their family context … child protection teams dominated by Pakeha professionals who were going to make the key decisions.”

- Sir Michael Cullen, Minister of Social Welfare 1987

* 1. The ethnic composition of staff is dominated by Pākehā.
  2. The recruitment, selection and promotion of staff is culturally biased in favour of Pākehā appointments.
  3. Staff training is monocultural and ignores the issue of personal and institutional racism.
  4. The physical environment is monocultural and alienating to Māori consumers (1984, p. 38).

Additionally, the report chronicled how the DSW practiced institutional racism in its staffing by:


* employing an overwhelming majority of Pākehā staff, and
* allowing Pākehā to dominate decision-making positions. Furthermore, in continuing such practices, the DSW perpetuated a racist service to consumers (1984, p. 18).

Puao-te-Ata-Tū described racism as an intentional form of discrimination, defining institutional racism as: ‘the outcome of monocultural institutions which simply ignore and freeze out the cultures who do not belong to the majority. National structures are evolved which are rooted in the values, systems and viewpoints of one culture only’ (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986, p. 19). Whether done consciously or unconsciously, institutional racism and the privileging of Pākehā had become normalised Crown practice. This making of racism ‘ordinary’ has been so successful it renders it almost invisible for those working within or in close quarters to Crown agencies (Came, 2012, p. 254). Recently, Gráinne Moss acknowledged that Oranga Tamariki was institutionally racist in her statement to the Royal Commission (Waitangi Tribunal, 2020, November 24).

The state machine which serves to marginalise Māori and maintain Pākehā power is institutionally racist.

Being viewed through the lens of institutional racism enables Māori staff experiences to be fully understood. The following section describes aspects of ‘institutional racism’ clearly identified in the literature that contributes to the systemic racism across the State Care system.

The purpose of the following section is to recognise the embedded systemic racism and bias within public institutions and how this has shaped the experience of Māori staff working with the sector. The following figure demonstrates the drivers of institutional racism as identified in the literature.

Figure 7.1. Toe State as a machine: Institutional racism and how this manifests in the State Care sector

“I was so naïve at my pōwhiri my kaumātua said, ‘We're giving her to you to learn your ways and come back to the iwi and help us’. I believed it ... yeah, and that was just naivety, though, because I didn't know about bureaucracy. I didn't know about institutionalised racism.”

– Raewyn Nordstrom, Māori social worker

## Marginalisation of the Māori workforce

The shortage of skilled staff, particularly of Māori staff, in the State Care sector has been reported in various public documents since the 1950’s (Garlick, 2012; Dalley, 1998a; Hill, 2009). Puao-te-Ata- Tū clearly identifies ‘a racial imbalance in staffing’ stating that a lack of Māori staff compromised the service of the department at the time:

We were told that the absence of brown faces inhibits Maori clients of the Department and we accept this. However, we are not convinced that the answer to such problems lies in the wholesale recruitment of Maori staff. Nevertheless, a racial imbalance exists in staffing and the Department should monitor this carefully whilst working consistently to redress the imbalance (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986, p. 38).

The DSW was criticised for the lack of Māori employed. Furthermore, the Māori staff who were employed, complained that they were ‘used as window dressing and expected to share the knowledge of their culture whenever required without having this knowledge recognised as a work-related skill’ (MAC, 1986, p. 22).


The marginalisation of Māori staff within the State Care sector creates additional challenges for Māori, particularly when they are isolated within departments and institutions. Limited access to or exclusion from ‘like’ networks means marginalised employees have difficulty gaining beneficial support (Ibarra, 1993). In addition, the dominating group are generally ‘unaware of their power’ and go about their daily activities without any substantial knowledge about, or meaningful interactions with, people who are different from them (Howard, 1999, p. 58).


Public service staff ethnic composition data, although very patchy, demonstrates how Māori staff have been marginalised across the sector. Highlighting the imbalance in ethnic composition of staff and the client group, the WARAG report cited the ethnic composition of the staff as evidence of institutional racism. Staff comprised 71% Pākehā, 22% Māori, and 5% Pacific Islanders. Despite the children/youth in residential institutions comprising 22% Pākehā, 62% Māori and 16% of Pacific Island origin (WARAG, 1984).

Statistics on Māori public servants was published for the first time in the 1988 Census which yielded information on 65% of all public servants (Māori made up 9.9%). In 1997/1998, government departments were required to report their Equal Employment Opportunities (EEO) data using ethnicity classification for the time. In 1999 the State Services Commission (SSC) published ‘Māori in the Public Service: A statistical profile 1993-1998’ based on this data.

Historically, Māori were more likely to work in service delivery positions within the State Care sector, which are more likely to be marginalised within the overall public sector workforce. The majority of Māori public servants were employed by six departments: Department of Corrections, Department of Courts, Department of Labour, Department of Social Welfare, Inland Revenue and Te Puni Kōkiri. The graph below demonstrates that the departments of welfare, justice and labour employed over 54% of all Māori staff in public service. Many of the departments were reported as having high levels of interaction directly with Māori in the community, either in groups or individually, and had a client base that was disproportionately Māori (SSC, 1999, p. 13).


The MAU report noted low wages in the clerical system where Māori staff were predominantly employed. There was also high staff turnover in parts of the DSW’s operations, a feeling of powerlessness and an inability, or lack of encouragement to contribute ideas or provide feedback on departmental policies and procedures (MAU, 1985, p. 12). The salary distribution graph (Graph 7.2) from the SSC’s Māori statistical profile demonstrates that most Māori public servants sat in the middle range of salary bands. The report suggested ‘that there may be some sort of ‘glass ceiling’ for Māori at around the $50,000 mark’ (SSC, 1999, p. 14).

Graph 7.1. Location of Māori staff in the Public Service (1998)

Graph 7.2. Comparative distribution of salary band

During the 1990s, through fiscal constraints and the drive for efficiency gains, there was a significant downsizing of the public service sector (SSC, 1999). Increasingly, public service staff were employed on individual contracts. In 1993, over 40% of staff were on individual contracts compared with 17% of other staff, staff turnover in departments was at the lowest level for four years and resignations averaged 10% (SSC, 1999). Service delivery roles tend to be under-resourced and yet are often the focus of ‘rationalisations. The following graph sourced from Garlick (2012, p. 102) demonstrates the increase in staff over a 15-year period from 1972 to 1987. The graph shows a significant increase over time in executive and clerical staff, with social workers and institutional staff remaining relatively static over the period.

Research literature demonstrates how Māori staff, employed predominantly in service delivery roles rather than in managerial positions, were marginalised across the public State Care service sector throughout the 1950-1999 period.

Graph 7.3. Department of Social Welfare Staff, 1972-87

“There were only about 30 (Māori staff) of us in the whole of Social Welfare. Most of us were in admin and typing, and I was the most senior Māori, and the Cultural Development Unit was basically the Māori Unit.”

– Doug Hauraki, Māori senior public servant

## Inequitable employment opportunities and conditions

Inequitable employment practices and conditions within the state sector have adversely impacted Māori workers.

### Inequitable employment practices

The WARAG report found cultural bias existed through employment selection procedures and processes (1984). The criteria applied to DSW recruitment decisions were Pākehā defined and privileging. Although educational qualifications were only one aspect of the selection criteria, they appeared to be given additional emphasis in employment (WARAG, 1984, p. 24). A series of recommendations were made by WARAG to address inequity in employment for Māori including:

* Establishing an affirmative action promotion programme.
* Resources to be made available for the training and support of Māori staff.
* Māori staff to be deployed in positions involving direct contact with Māori consumers.
* Māori staff to be free to work in ways aligned with their culture.
* Employment procedures and processes be reviewed to achieve equity with ethnic composition of the consumer groups.

(WARAG, 1984, p. 19).

Similarly, the MAU report noted staff inequities driven through privileging of educational qualifications. ‘The crunch has been that due to their lack of academic qualifications they cannot enjoy the same privileges and authority to make decisions accorded their counterparts’ (MAU, 1985, p. 18). It is clear that for most of the 50-year period (1950-2000) Māori cultural experience, knowledge, community networks and lived experience were not valued by the public service. and had a client base that was disproportionately Māori (SSC, 1999, p. 13).

Puao-te-Ata-Tū also noted the lack of Māori in decision-making roles, acknowledging the insistence on academic qualifications for many positions in the DSW effectively ‘locked the gate’ against Māori applicants (MAC, 1986). Thus, Puao-te-Ata- Tū recommended that all recruitment processes should reflect the needs of Māori and the Māori community, that appointment processes should include persons knowledgeable in Māoritanga. The staffing recommendations focussed on additional training programmes to develop understanding and awareness of Māori and cultural issues among departmental staff, with appropriately experienced, ideally local, instructors, as well as relief provided to enable staff to attend.

Gardiner and Parata (1998), in their investigation into Māori staff recruitment and retention, found that little had changed across the public service. While there was a commitment to recruiting Māori staff, they noted recruitment tended to focus on junior entry level and less consideration had been given to senior staff lateral entry (p. 5). Further, they found the policies and procedures were not in place across the public service to build strategic Māori capability.

On the whole, with some few exceptions, HR practitioners seemed not to have a policy in place or process options directed at Māori recruitment and retention, and there were no examples reported of systemic provision for dealing with the portfolio of matters Māori. This was in spite of the majority of HR practitioners recognising the importance of the Treaty and Māori staff to the work of their organisations (Gardiner & Parata, 1998, p. 8).

“Māori staff marginalised and “accused of collusion. We were passed over in promotion, it was near on impossible to rise to team supervisor. I worked in sites in Waikato where able Māori practitioners were passed over for practice leader roles. I sat in many a room with tearful Māori practitioners who were traumatised by how Māori were treated.”

– Pauline Tucker/Raewyn Bhana, non-Māori social workers


### Inequitable Māori leadership opportunities

While social, economic, and demographic indicators show Māori populations are in greatest need of public services, the positioning of Māori leadership inside the public service, as part of the solution, is not visible as a system-level priority (Bean, 2018, p. 53). There was no systematic approach; nor was there a recognised Māori approach to developing Māori leadership and career pathways for Māori public servants during the period. The dearth of public sector research in the field means critical Māori elements appear not to be well understood, with no clear descriptions or practice guidelines (Bean, 2018).

Additionally, Bean (2018), notes a continued ambivalent attitude to kaupapa Māori perspectives of leadership and how those perspectives differ from equally contested conceptions of Western leadership. This reinforces an awkward lack of ‘substantive engagement by the public sector in developing Māori leadership’ (Bean, 2018. P. 54).

Statistics on Māori in senior management positions were collected for the first time in 1998. The State Services Commission found that for Māori only 2.1% held senior management positions whereas the figure was 3.7% for total staff (SSC, 1998). There were 85 senior managers (56 men and 29 women) who identified as Māori in 1998. Graph 7.4 demonstrates the proportion of Māori in senior management positions in 1998.

Although 80% of all Māori staff were employed in six departments, this was not reflected in the senior management profile. Apart from Te Puni Kōkiri, only two departments reported having five or more Māori in senior management (Department of Commerce and Department of Courts), and two having more than 10% of their senior managers who were Māori (Department of Commerce and Ministry of Women’s Affairs) (SSC, 1999, p. 16).

Graph 7.4. Proportion of Māori in Senior Management compared to proportion of Public Service Staff in Senior Management (1998)

“I remember Shirley, as a Māori, we all pushed for her to be the first Māori ... in fucking West Auckland, the first Māori supervisor, and we fought for it. Then we fought for Donna to be the first Māori manager … back then, Māori weren't the bosses. We were never in charge.”

– Raewyn Nordstrom, Māori social worker

Gardiner and Parata (1998) found ‘Māori considered the senior executives of the public service to exhibit attributes of a monocultural style of leadership that is unappealing’ (p. 34). In addition, the ‘lack of Māori in top positions, other than the head of the Māori agency, is received as a signal that career pathways in the public service are limited and typecast for Māori’ (p. 34).

Leadership opportunities specifically within social work for Māori staff were infrequent prior to the 1980s. With the drive to increase Māori staff post Puao-te-Ata-Tū, Māori were increasingly recruited into leadership positions. In 1996, the professional social work body Aotearoa New Zealand Association of Social Workers (ANZASW) first initiated two caucuses: Tauiwi, and Māori, to govern the organisation side by side, as well as provide leadership in the profession (O’Donoghue, 2003)

It is common in public agencies for the government to assume positions of leadership on behalf of indigenous peoples. However, not only does this approach foster both dependency and assimilation, it also undermines indigenous leadership (Durie, 2004, p. 14). Sorrenson (1996) found that Children, Young Persons and their Families Service (CYPS) management (predominately Tauiwi), while espousing the philosophy of Puao-te-Ata-Tū and later Te Punga, resisted the implementation of many pro-Māori initiatives because they feared loss of power.

Sorrenson (1996) found that managerial attitudes were a significant factor regarding the responsiveness of CYPS to Māori. It was not only the lack of Māori in State Care leadership positions that was concerning, but also the inability and inappropriate management of leadership within Crown agencies involved in State Care. The Human Rights Commission (HRC) (1992) cited a hui where one Māori representative commented:

Inappropriate people are in control of the Crown agencies, they’re people who have no real knowledge or understanding of The Treaty of Waitangi. They lack any understanding of tikanga Māori and Māori people. These agencies have ultimate control, yet they’re run by people who have no real commitment to the Treaty (HRC, 1992, p. 105).

There is evidence in the interview data of Pākehā workers in the Department of Social Welfare who were deeply sympathetic to the plight of Māori and saw the racism within the department. One interviewee describes such a situation.

The literature demonstrates that Māori staff have been marginalised through inequitable employment practices, and lack of opportunities to develop Māori leadership within the State Care sector.

“There were two of them (Pākehā staff), they were senior social workers, and they gave up their jobs naively, saying that Maori people should be appointed into their positions. But, of course they didn't have the power to make the appointment. So, it didn't happen. They gave up the job, but Māori weren't appointed. Those were the sort of people that they were.”

– Harry Walker, Māori public servant

“I worry for Māori who have gone into the department, I would hate for them to be set up because quite often that is what happens. They say to Māori, ‘You are Māori, you can do this, and you can do that’. And then if something doesn't work, ‘Oh yes, you've had that chance. You can't do it’.”

– Te Inupo Farrar, Māori Mātua Whāngai and DSW social worker

## Working within the constantly changing state machine

The State Care sector has been plagued with almost continuous changes involving mergers, restructuring and redundancy since its inception. During the 1970s the move to merge the administrative and welfare functions of the state under the Department of Social Welfare caused a significant upheaval. The report ‘Social Welfare at the Crossroads’ was released by The New Zealand Association of Social Workers in 1971 (NZASW, 1971). The report described concerns over the fragmented services, barriers to service and areas of unmet and under met needs. In addition, concerns were expressed relating to administrative focus for promotion, changes in staff, loss of quality service, and disruption of service to clients (NZASW, 1971).

In the 1970s the DSW was coming under increasing external scrutiny over the appropriateness of residential care and its ‘centralised, bureaucratised social service provision’ (Garlick, 2012, p. 74). A ‘community development’ approach was introduced to strengthen formal and informal support systems within communities. However, this approach, as evidenced in previous chapters, was never resourced appropriately so led to a crisis of capability and capacity through the subsequent decades in the 1980s and 1990s, public sector management went through another profound reorganisation. This involved the corporatisation and privatisation of many state assets, with the separation of the roles of funder, purchaser, and provider. Non-commercial or ‘core’ public functions of the state were separated from commercial functions to enable the latter to be contracted out to private organisations, in the pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness (Boston, 1996, p. 104).

A feature of the ‘new contractualism’ was the creation of a competitive system of service provision. The intention was to incorporate the market into the welfare state, with the state retaining its role as funder, but transferring its task as provider to a variety of independent providers in the third sector (which included private, profit-making businesses as well as community and voluntary not-for-profit organisations) and state agencies (Crampton, Woodward & Dowell, 2001). The devolution by the state during the 1980s and 1990s, caused a rapid expansion in the number and size of not-for-profit organisations. The increasing reliance on contracting was welcomed by many Māori since it provided opportunities for iwi and other Māori-based organisations to compete for tenders to supply various services (e.g., health care, social services) (Boston, 1996, p. 105).

During this period, social services were encouraged to be ‘effective’ and ‘efficient’, both in terms of interaction with clients and with regards to paperwork and time management. Non- governmental organisations (NGOs) had the dual challenge of meeting these demands in relation to working with people, in addition to fulfilling the other requirements of their funding contracts including the constant funding re-applications (Connolly, 2001). Sorrenson (1996) found that the structures put in place post Puao-te-Ata-Tū were not built on consultation with Māori at any meaningful level. Further, ongoing restructuring had a detrimental effect on the relationship with Māori and the ability to respond (Sorrenson, 1996, p. 114). The State Service Commission report (1998) on Māori in the public service, noted there ‘is a disproportionate loss of Māori staff when restructuring of a department includes the closing down of regional offices that have a high percentage of employees who are Māori’ (p. 2).

The constant changes by government to address inconsistencies relating to iwi and cultural practices had adverse impacts on Māori practitioners as they obstructed Māori social worker practice. Māori designated positions were often disestablished as part of ongoing restructuring resulting in Māori social workers frequently having to change jobs (Doolan, 2006; Hollis, 2006; Hollis-English 2012, 2015; Love, 2000; Moyle, 2013).

The literature indicates the constantly changing State Care context adversely impacted Māori staff resulting in redundancy, constant job changing and insecurity of employment.

“In 1999. I left the Department“, I was like, ‘This is bullshit.’ You keep on adapting; I'd worked in the Comms team with Breaking the Cycle. I was particularly proud of that. I thought that was a good piece of work, only to find out that we had a national campaign, so you're raising awareness, but there was no infrastructure to deal with that.”

– Māori social worker

## Working in institutions designed by the state

Research has shown that the context in which staff work has a significant impact on their experience, the way in which they work and how they operate (Braithwaite et al., 2016). The nature and purpose of social work in particular is determined by the organisational context, as workers usually have a position of limited power, influence and authority (Jones & May, 1992).

In their review of Māori working in the public service, Gardiner and Parata (1998) found that significant numbers of Māori reported the public service in general, as culturally unsafe or compromising environments. Both Chief Executives and Māori staff reported concern about cultural harassment and wondered whether it needed to assume the same profile as sexual harassment before it could be confronted and dealt with (Gardiner & Parata, 1998. p. 36).

Throughout the period of 1950-1999 Māori staff worked within institutions that were developed under colonial structures and systems inherited from Britain which were recognised as being institutionally racist.

### The Department of Social Welfare, CYPS

The Department of Social Welfare was for the majority of the period (1950-1999) the state service provider, however it morphed into various formations within the 50-year period. The Child Welfare Act 1925 established the Child Welfare Branch within the Department of Education in 1926. This Branch became a Division in 1948. Child Welfare Officers, which included Māori Welfare Officers were referred to as field staff until the early 1950s. A lack of training was seen as a major obstacle, and most field staff learned on the job (Garlick, 2012). In 1971, the Social Welfare Act resulted in the merger of the Child Welfare Division with the Department of Social Security in 1972 to form the Department of Social Welfare (DSW).

In 1985, the Māori Advisory Unit concluded that the DSW was institutionally racist, ‘it was a typical, hierarchical bureaucracy, the rules of which reflected the values of the dominant Pākehā society’ (MAU, 1985 p. 11). This and other reports led to the subsequent Puao-te-Ata-Tū inquiry and report (1988) in which widespread changes were recommended. Following Puao-te-Ata-Tū, the Human Rights Commission Inquiry in 1992 noted that the service continues ‘to disempower whānau, hapū, and iwi from being able to look after their own’ (Human Rights Commission, 1992 p. 78). In addition, the research report noted ‘Puao-te-Ata-Tū is being ignored and there is a contradiction between the policies of the Department and the spirit of the Act’ which created a dilemma for Māori people working for the DSW and other Crown agencies (Human Rights Commission, 1992, p. 170).

The workload pressures of the 1970s saw casework decisions delegated to district offices. Increasingly, the DSW became reliant on volunteer schemes and by 1994 nearly 1500 volunteers were engaged.

“So they put them all in there, so we had babies right up to bloody 17 years old. Sexual abuse, domestic violence, suicide, all in the one whare. But they didn't think to look at their needs - that we might need to have some extra support or something, resources in place.”

- Daniel Mataki, Māori family home parent

“The people most concerned about it (the CYPF Act) were those people who had been in total control of the system until then. There were practitioners (in DSW) who did not think their practices were disempowering so they were resisting the need to change. There was outright racism as well … and that resistance that came from thinking they knew better… the organisation had to show leadership in spite of the racism and the resistance.” Rahera Ohia, former senior Māori public servant.”

- Rahera Ohia, Māori senior public servant

The Children, Young Persons, and their Families Act in 1989 brought about restructuring and reorganisations creating the Ministry of Social Development, and the establishment of the New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service (CYPS). Sorrenson’s (1996) research examining the responsiveness of CYPS management to Māori, found that while a consistent philosophy of inclusion and participation was espoused by managers, there was a lack of effective structures to ensure effective participation with Māori. Management participants in Sorrenson’s study claimed they had an inclusive or participatory management philosophy. However, when examined closely, Sorrenson found this did not extend to Māori staff participating actively in policy or practice decision-making, nor did it translate to working with Māori individuals or organisations outside of CYPS or have a close working relationship with iwi Māori.

1989: There were practitioners (in DSW / CYFS) who did not think their practices were disempowering so they were resisting the need to change. There was outright racism as well … but that resistance … the organisation had to show leadership in spite of the racism.

Sorrenson’s (1996) study noted that although Māori staff and cultural behaviours were accommodated within the framework of mainstream institutions, Māori remained dependent and subservient to Pākehā managers and power brokers. The reluctance to share power during this period was evident ‘because of Pākehā reluctance to share or entrust significant control over resources and decision- making with Māori colleagues and ‘clients’ any gains made are, with very few exceptions still within a framework of Pākehā control’ (Harre-Hindmarsh, 1993, p. 7). Sorrenson (1996) contends the notion of biculturalism was interpreted by management within CYPS and had very little to do with the ‘notions of power sharing implicit in understandings of biculturalism that include the Treaty of Waitangi and the concept of tino rangatiratanga’ (p. 177). Several researchers asserted at the time, the department was practicing ongoing colonisation through the promotion of a tokenistic and diluted form of biculturalism (Harre-Hindmarsh, 1993; Kelsey, 1990; Sorrenson, 1996). Kelsey (1990) noted that many public sector officials took on board the rhetoric of biculturalism, however they used it as a tool of assimilation (Kelsey, 1990, p. 267). Thus, the likelihood is high that Māori staff working for the state sector during the 1980s and 1990’s experienced tokenism.

### Residential institutions

There were 17 government institutions in 1948, rising to 20 by 1972, and to 26 by the early 1980s. In 1959 a Superintendent of Registered Children’s Homes and Child Care Centres was established.

During the 1960s the steadily increasing numbers of state wards had a significant impact on the residential institutions. They were increasingly used as a remand facility to keep young people in the city while they waited to appear in court. To cope with demand, family homes and new residential homes run by religious and voluntary organisations, were supported by the state.

The conditions across residential institutions were highly variable. Literature analysis shows evidence of both; abuse perpetrated by staff, and supportive and caring staff (Sutherland, 2020; Dalley, 1998a; Stanley, 2016). Stanley (2016) believes the increased institutionalisation and harsh environments were a product of the highly punitive political climate at the time when ‘there was a real moral panic about youth delinquents’ (p. 51). Residences were hierarchical, based heavily on punitive models of custody, and while policies and procedures were manualised, staff were inadequately trained, and senior staff supervision was insufficient (Stanley, 2016). The institutional settings, especially Kingslea and Fareham House, were described in 1973 as ‘outdated facilities, inadequate grounds and inappropriately designed buildings in some cases described as deplorable conditions’ (Stanley, 2016, p. 52).

There was a general lack of trained staff within residences and often critical staffing shortages. ‘The system allowed staff with extremely limited experience to look after children with the most severe personal and social problems’ (Colton, 2002 cited Stanley, 2016). Poor pay and conditions for staff, low morale and staff shortages and critical understaffing were commonplace (Stanley, 2016).

A review of the Social Work Division in 1982 found variable staffing levels across the institutions, with some being critically understaffed. Separate staffing of secure units of four or more beds was recommended, and it was noted that even though secure work was the most sensitive and difficult work it was often undertaken by the most junior staff (DSW, 1982; Parker, 2006). There were problems providing adequate formal supervision due to a lack of trained staff (DSW, Social Work Manual, 1984) which led to shambolic administration and night staffing levels inadequate to manage an emergency (Sutherland, 2020, p. 101).

Sir Kim Workman (2019) in his submission to the Royal Commission noted only a few residential staff at Kohitere were ‘adequately trained for the task of rehabilitating young men’. Workman notes, while officially the principal could administer punishment, the farming and forestry instructors regularly punished boys, with the intention to instil good work habits. The night staff were untrained, and some were genuinely fearful for their safety and not without cause (Workman, 2019).

In 1969, Ian Kahurangi Mitchell, who had been an assistant housemaster at Owairaka Boys’ Home was asked to describe the effort made to recognise the culture of the Māori and Pacific Island Boys. At the time, he reported that while 80% of the boys were Māori, only two staff were Māori and there was ‘no evidence of staff training … in fact there was virtual illiteracy, staff had no training in cultural differences. It was absolute monoculturalism ... there was a lot of cultural arrogance and no other cultural identification or cultural pride. Māori were … put down and treated with contempt’ (Mitchell’s testimony at ACORD/Ngā Tamatoa/Arohanui public inquiry as cited in Sutherland, 2020 p. 98).

The 1979, Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination (ACORD), Ngā Tamatoa, Arohanui Inc inquiry report into residential care concluded ‘the administration of the system is mono-racial; and if these institutions are ever going to deal with Māori and Pacific Island children, they are first and foremost going to have to implement an immediate programme of affirmative action for Māori women and Māori men in these institutions. This would be the first measure necessary to help eradicate the inherent racism within the homes’ (Sutherland, 2020, p. 102). State Care staff reported problems with overcrowding and difficulties managing the increasing number of residents who were violent, disturbed, linked to gangs, or had problems with drugs or alcohol (Parker, 2006). Stanley (2016) describes the jobs as intensely stressful with staff required to work long hours. Overly authoritarian attitudes has been attributed to overcrowding and inadequately trained staff (Stanley, 2016).

“We hear (racist comments) today still, but to hear it from qualified social workers and people who should have known better … it’s a stark memory.”

– Shane Graham, Māori social worker

Sutherland (2020) provided examples where boys in residential homes, such as Owairaka, preferred being in Mount Eden prison as the conditions were better (p. 97).

Documentation highlights that Māori staff were most likely to be in lower paid positions, employed to do building and maintenance, or domestic duties such as running the kitchens (Sutherland, 2020, Workman, 2019; MSD, n.d.). However, they were expected to supervise residences while employed in these domestic roles. Generally, most Māori working in the State Care system were not in professional roles, did not have training and would have been answering to Pākehā as trained clinicians/social workers (MSD, n.d).

There was a lack of state monitoring of residential institutions. Between 1978-1987 ‘Visiting Committees’ were established with the purpose of visiting and examining standards at residential institutions. They were limited in their objectivity, most being made up of ex-department staff and did little to monitor resident’s welfare, and failed to report inappropriate conduct by staff (Sutherland, 2020, Dalley, 1998a). In 1982, the DSW employed two officers and an administrator to provide oversight for 21 institutions and 162 family homes. Further, institutional carers were able to give the impression of adequate care when inspections were carried out (Dalley, 1998a). This ‘faking of care’, during official inspections was common practice (Stanley, 2016).

The problems with residential facilities received widespread attention in 1978 through a series of well-publicised inquiries and investigations, beginning with allegations of cruel and inhuman punishment in Auckland residences by the Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination (ACORD, 1978). An ACORD report into residential care noted staff were at the root of problems, given the employment of people totally unsuited to the job of caring for the most vulnerable of those entrusted to the care of the state (Sutherland, 2020).

There was no ethnicity data relating to residential staff in the literature (Sandford, 1973; Stanley, 2016; Simcock, 1972; Parker, 2006). This indicates that leadership and residential management did not treat the ethnicity of staff as a relevant factor in employment. However, staff with a military, teaching or sporting backgrounds were highly valued (Stanley, 2016). In terms of the hiring, training, and the ongoing development of staff, competency to work with Māori was not a factor for consideration. The 1982, The Human Rights Commission report into residential care, noted the ‘employment of people totally unsuited to the job’, and recommended that ‘bicultural rather than military background should be sought’ and ‘flexibility, adaptability, and sensitivity should have precedence over administrative or authoritative skills’(Sutherland 2020, p. 123). The commission urged all ‘staff to be trained, including multicultural studies as a strand through all staff training programmes’ (Sutherland, 2020, p. 123).

Research has overwhelmingly shown that residential State Care institutions were institutionally racist.

“I guess from that (my experience as a child in State Care), many of the homes I went into gave me a sense that there's got to be a better way, ... and who better than the people that lived through and gone through the system to be the ones that could facilitate (change).”

- Shane Graham, Māori social worker

### Psychiatric institutions

Early Western models of psychiatric care were marked by large institutions with a limited range of treatments. Most institutions were opened before 1900 including, Sunnyside in Christchurch (1863), Oakley in Auckland, (1867 with the addition of Carrington in 1972), Porirua (1872), Seacliff in Dunedin (1884), Wakari in Dunedin (1887). Several others opened in the first part of the twentieth century, including: Seaview in Hokitika (1912), Tokanui in Te Awamutu (1915) Ngawhatu in Nelson (1922) and Kingseat in Karaka (1932). Lake Alice was opened in 1950 with Cherry Farm in 1952. Additionally, there were four psychopaedic institutions, Braemar in Nelson (1876), Templeton in Christchurch (1929), Kimberly in Levin, (1945) and Mangere in Auckland (1966). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s most mentally ill people were treated at specialist hospitals. In 1969, the 11 psychiatric hospitals and four psychopaedic hospital represented 43% of public hospital beds.

While the push for deinstitutionalisation began in the late 1950s, it wasn’t until the 1970s that community care through NGO’s became widespread as an alternative to institutional care. During the 1970s, a number of high-profile cases revealing the appalling treatment of many in psychiatric institutions eventually led to deinstitutionalisation. For example, the treatment of children in State Care who were placed in Lake Alice under the care of Dr Leeks was publicised widely by ACORD in 1976-1978. They reported electric shock treatment administered as punishment to children as young as eight-years-old, solitary confinement in concrete cells, and injections used as threats or punishment, without authority given by their family or by Social Welfare Officers (Sutherland, 2020. p. 135). The Mitchell inquiry into these events in 1977 exonerated Lake Alice stating, ‘the hospital was entitled to imply in all the circumstance that the treatment should continue if the need arose for it’ (Sutherland, 2020, p. 141). Finally, as a result of numerous letters, protests and complaints by ACORD, children’s families, psychologists, teachers and health board staff, about the ongoing treatment of children in Lake Alice, the unit finally closed in 1978. Almost all psychiatric hospitals were repurposed or closed by the 1990s.

Those that remained open were subject to a government inquiry led by Judge Ken Mason in response to a number of high-profile cases within the community, and a death in psychiatric care as a result of electro-convulsive therapy (ECT). The Mason Psychiatric report (1988) identified various themes including: the absence of a Māori perspective during assessment, the gatekeeping of services by Pākehā, and inadequately trained staff. The gatekeepers of psychiatric services, medical staff such as doctors, nurses and psychiatrists, were described as monocultural.

Whānau interviewed for the inquiry noted that ‘illnesses and signs of distress which could be in the context of a patient’s Māoriness were misidentified and treated in terms of Western psychiatry’. The impacts on Māori patients of inadequately trained staff, and the lack of Māori staff was evidenced: ‘If a person under stress was seen to be speaking to his or her tipuna, this was thought to be a hallucination. Because this was interpreted as evidence of psychosis, the diagnosis may be made accordingly, and treatment carried out with anti-psychotic medication’ (Mason et al., 1988, p. 168).

The Mason Report concluded with a series of recommendations indicating that capability within the psychiatric system was of significant concern. They called for the appointment of a Māori health coordinator to the forensic team, representatives of the Māori community to be included in all major appointments to Area Boards and the Hospital Board, and for all senior appointments to be conditional on the appointee having knowledge and appreciation of Māori culture, tikanga and taha wairua.

The evidence from the report showed Māori staff were not in leadership or clinical positions, the environment was hierarchical, clinical and ‘gatekept’ by Pākehā staff. Thus, psychiatric residences were institutionally racist.

### Special schools

The special education division was created within the Department of Education in 1908. The Education Amendment Act of 1910 made it compulsory for children with disabilities to be educated. However, the first school for the deaf was founded in 1880. Health Camps were instituted in the mid-1930s.

The native school system ran parallel to the state system until 1969. Native schools were expected to teach only in English, and te reo Māori was actively discouraged. The Department of Education Director General claimed the natural abandonment of the native tongue involved no loss to the Māori (Simon & Smith, 2001). Between 1900 and 1960 the proportion of Māori fluent in te reo decreased from 95% to 25% (Simon & Smith, 2001).

In 1966, the Department of Education Psychological Service was involved in helping approximately 10,000 children, about one in every 65 of the total school population. Alongside institutions, there was an expansion of school facilities to help maladjusted children with 45 teachers working in classes which contained, almost exclusively, children described as maladjusted. During 1966, 8,700 children were enrolled in the various special schools, classes and clinics provided to help students whose educational needs could not be reasonably met in ordinary classrooms. The largest number of special classes were for backward children. There were also special primary school classes for the physically handicapped, for the partially sighted and the partially deaf, for children in hospital, and for emotionally disturbed children.

The records held by the Ministry of Education on residential schools are patchy. Campbell Park in Otago has the most comprehensive records therefore we have chosen to draw on those archival reports to demonstrate the challenges faced by Māori staff working in residential schools.

### Records from Campbell Park

Campbell Park School was a residential school for male children who were considered ‘backward’ and/ or who had behavioural problems. It was previously known as Otekaike (Otekaieke) Special School for Boys. In 1972, approximately 60% of the boys at Campbell Park were state wards, most of who had social difficulties. The remainder were admitted at the request of their parents following a recommendation from the Department of Social Welfare or the Department of Education’s Psychological Service. About 60% of the pupils were Māori or Pacific Island boys and this percentage was noted as being fairly stable for some years. The school received about 85% of its pupils from the North Island (Briefing paper on Campbell Park School, 1972).

The archival data on Campbell Park indicates that staffing, in terms of unsuitable staff, lack of training, and difficulties in recruitment due to lack of applicants, was a significant and enduring issue. Official correspondence reveals: violence by some of the boys, inadequate supervision, and the Principal expressing concern about keeping other boys safe.

In 1972, staff threatened to strike unless they had six more staff, or unless the number of boys was reduced to give the same pupil/staff ratio (Campbell Park archival records). There were frequent staff changes, frustration over lack of professional training, staff complaints/staff assessments, staff not complying with orders and concern that ‘the standard of childcare may suffer from less than adequate staff’ (letter from the Principal of Campbell Park to Director General of Education, 4th July 1979).

In 1986, there was a letter noted from a representative from ACORD – Expressing concern over ‘the treatment of young people at Campbell Park School’. The concerns included:

* 1. Over 50% of the boys are Maori and Polynesian and yet the school is entirely monocultural in its approaches and procedures. Most of the boys are outside their own tribal areas and have little or no access to local Maori people. They are too far from home for their family to visit them. Thus even though some of them are as young as eight-years-old, they have no role models, no-one to identify with and no support group.
  2. The attitudes of some staff are blatantly racist. There is no attempt to provide taha Maori, and the excuse given is that there is a lack of dedicated Maori staff. No responsibility is taken by Pākehā staff for racism, or for encouraging cultural differences.
  3. There are almost no women on the staff, thus reinforcing the link between maleness and dominance in the minds of the boys, and ensuring a dearth of nurturing skills and real motherly care. Boys must call everyone ‘Sir’ or ‘Miss’ – no names.
  4. Both the Principal and the second in command bemoan the impending legislating out of corporal punishment. Discipline is Victorian, rigid and punitive; boys walking in silent grey-uniformed lines between the dining hall and their houses, and being sent back if they make a noise; a Maori boy being singled out in assembly and publicly shamed in front of the whole school by having his misdemeanour and his punishment described at length; mail is censored both in and out of the school.

We believe that any one of these issues would warrant a full inspection into the running of the school – in fact into the justification of its existence. Taken together, the picture is horrendous. We hope that you, as Regional Superintendent, can initiate some substantial changes. The present visiting committee consists entirely of outside professionals – a new committee involving strong Māori and Pacific Island people, and young people to whom the boys can talk with confidence, could well be a desirable beginning. We wonder too about the nature of conditions at Salisbury House and whether it has been possible for the Education Department to exercise a benign influence there? (Pourtney, 1986).

On the 27th May 1986 the Regional Superintendent of Education, Southern Region responded to Charmaine Pourtney from ACORD. The letter appears largely dismissive of her concerns about racism and of the treatment of boys and asks for more detailed descriptions of incidents. In response to her criticisms the letter stated;

It is well established that a high proportion of boys at Campbell Park come from the upper part of the North Island and a great many of them are Māoris and Pacific Islanders. It is difficult to say to what extent this is the result of the force of circumstances (letter, Regional Superintendent of Education, Southern Region, 1986).

The Superintendent agrees there are difficulties in finding appropriate resource people to ‘provide Taha Maori... [and] it is agreed, it is unsatisfactory in this respect’ (Regional Superintendent of Education, Southern Region, 1986).

A 1992 study of children and young people in out- of-family care investigated a variety of residential placements for children and young people including: the DSW residences, special schools, faith-based residences, health camps, corrective training centres, and youth prisons. Māori researchers found that.

* Institutions saw themselves as ‘places of last resort for desperate families and their children’ which created the potential abuses of power to occur (HRC, 1992, p. 155).
* Institution staff and placement agency staff (DSW) are in a position of power in relation to whānau Māori, and that this position is potentially abusive (HRC, 1992, p. 123; HRC, 1992).
* Placements in special schools took some children and young people miles away from their family and severely limited the ability of whānau to spend time with their child (HRC, 1992, p. 157).

The report noted the lack of culturally appropriate programmes for Māori children and the need for guidelines to be set which outline culturally appropriate programmes for Māori children in care. The report noted all institutions and care agencies needed formal and informal grievance procedures for Māori children and their whānau who are in ‘out of family care’. They should also be told at the beginning of their placement, and regularly reminded, that they can formally complain (HRC, 1992, p. 159).

Special schools were institutionally racist.

“(There were) None (referring to Māori programmes). Not in the institutions, not at all. They were still, post settlement, post everything. This was way before there was even a concept of what an iwi was, from their point of view.”

- Shane Graham, Māori social worker

## Māori staff working in roles defined by the state

The roles occupied by Māori in the State Care sector were designed through Western perspectives of care. Very early on they were described in regularly updated manuals, and included:

* The Field Officers Manual (Child Welfare Division) 1958 - 1969
* The Social Workers Manual (Child Welfare Division), 1970
* The Residential Workers Manual (Department of Social Welfare), around 1975/1976
* The Social Work Manuals (Department of Social Welfare) Volumes 1 and 2 around 1984

The manuals covered both district and national institutions and were supplemented by codes of practice, setting out desired standards of professional care, as well as individual policies and procedures. Among topics covered by the manuals were: admissions and discharge; privacy; contact with family, communities and social workers; discipline, rewards and recreation; health and medication; schooling; and secure care. Garlick, (2012) contends the in-house training, conducted using a combination of staff manuals and face-to- face training, was largely ineffectual. The Human Rights Commission (1992) found the DSW rules and regulations could be obstructive to the work of Māori working with families (HRC, 1992). Documenting staff practices and roles within the Department, with little consideration for Māori and those working with Māori whānau, is institutional racism.

### Māori welfare officers

In his 1944 annual report, the Minister of the Department of Native Affairs, Rex Mason, proposed a system of welfare officers in his department. The new welfare branch was set up in September 1944, beginning with a chief welfare officer and by March 1945 there were welfare officers in Ruatoria, Gisborne and a lady officer at head office in Wellington (Dalley, 1998b,). ‘Maori welfare officers’ remains a little-studied area of state welfare provision (Bryder & Tennant, 1998).

The definitions and patterns of work used by Pākehā welfare officers proved impractical and meaningless in a Māori context. Māori families (and Māori welfare officers) had a unique relationship to the state and defined their needs, and therefore 'welfare', in quite different ways to Pākehā (Labrum, 2002, p. 167). Māori welfare officers were meant to be, and were in practice, proactive in distinguishing where assistance was required and acting as they saw fit (Labrum, 2002). Their way of working went far beyond the regulatory and surveillance duties required of child welfare officers. It was noted by officials with regard to housing, but the assertion applied to all their work, that the Maori Affairs Department was 'probably unique ... in that it combines the functions of seeking out families ... awakening them ... to a realisation of their need and a willingness to cooperate in measures to meet it' (Draft memo from Maori welfare officer to Minister of Maori Affairs, 3 December 1956).

Māori welfare officers and the Māori Affairs Department as a whole, were directly and self- consciously concerned with 'race up-lift'. A key role of the of the Māori welfare officers was ‘stirring up the desire for advancement and development’ (Labrum, 2002 p. 165). These roles reflected the needs of the Māori population. As a result of colonisation and urbanisation, Māori were living in marked disadvantage in material terms and in conditions of life (life expectancy, health statistics, and mortality).

“When you get into the practice area you start getting individual human decision-making. Then, they'll rationalise it by terms of policy and managerial-driven stuff. The legislation which they will bullshit about, but I'm always interested in the practice area. I think that's where it's either make or break. Racism is deeply ingrained in the DNA of a lot of New Zealanders. The better educated you are, the better you are at rationalising your behaviour.”

– Harry Walker, Māori public servant

Māori welfare services covered a wide range of needs and desires. The ‘malleable nature of need’ was absolutely central for Māori (Labrum, 2002,

p. 170). Whānau needs encompassed jobs and vocational training, as well as money, food and other more conventional aspects of 'welfare'. Moreover, officers had a key role to ensure Māori received all the benefits they were entitled to, and to help individuals in their interactions with government departments that had previously declined to deal with them. Fundamentally, Māori welfare officers dealt with every facet of their clients' lives (Labrum, 2002).

Māori welfare officers were mediators and frequently acted as 'go-betweens' in relation to other state departments and to the larger Pākehā society, at both an individual and group level (Labrum, 2002). Māori welfare officers intervened in ways that made their work both acceptable and extremely useful to Māori families, however it invited greater scrutiny of those families (Dalley, 1998b). Interviews with kaumātua who described their role of the Māori welfare officer indicated that the role was like the modern day Whānau Ora Navigator:

Labrum (2002) notes that Pākehā perceptions of ‘need’ were different from those of Māori welfare officers, who whilst having the flexibility to respond to whānau need, still had to work within the structures of the state. Māori lived in a culture that was different to the one embodied by the welfare state, which was predicated on Pākehā familial models (Labrum, 2020). Individual Māori welfare officers had to battle continually to establish entitlement and legitimate need. They felt protectiveness intersected by a sense of responsibility for Māori as a group and the need to defend them (Labrum, 2002; Dalley, 1998b). The different articulation of needs by Māori and their varying ability and desire to live up to Pākehā norms and standards required Māori welfare officers to mount public relations exercises on behalf of their clients in the face of mounting Pākehā criticism of Māori (Labrum, 2002).

### Social workers

Social service practitioners, such as child welfare officers, became social workers in the early 1950s. Parallel to the rise of the modern Police Force, the social work profession is a foundational component to the creation, expansion, and adaptation of the settler state (Fortier & Wong, 2019). Eurocentrism dominates the profession of social work and therefore social work practices (Waterfall, 2002). While there are many paradigms for helping and offering social assistance among various cultures, Eurocentrism operates by centring Euro-Western theories and practices as the dominant social work paradigm. deMontigny (1995) asserts the activities of social work are about engaging in the socially organised practices of power from the standpoint of ruling relations.

“My experience in the early days of Māori welfare around the district was quite interesting. People have started talking about, "Oh, let's have all this navigating," you know ... they start talking about engaging with health, education, housing, voluntary sector, justice. We did all that while we were in Māori welfare. I was thinking, "They've got this new thing. They've got a new name and they're reverting to something that was done before, which, then got discredited. See, Māori welfare got disestablished.”

- Harry Walker, Māori public servant

Henwood (2015) reflecting on the Aotearoa New Zealand State Care system during the research period, noted; ‘Social work focussed on making placements, and then the state involvement was often withdrawn or absent. Locking up children in institutions had a huge effect, not only on their individual lives but on our whole society. There was a significant knock-on effect with many of the incarcerated children ending up in prison in later life’ (Henwood, 2015, p. 9). The act of social work as a profession in maintaining settler state power is evident across the reviewed literature. Fortier and Wong (2019) argue:

The social work profession remains circumscribed by three core responsibilities in the settler colonial process:

* 1. aiding in the dispossession and extraction of indigenous peoples from their territories and communities.
  2. supporting the (re)production of the settler state; and
  3. acting as a buffer zone to contain and pacify indigenous communities that are either engaged in direct confrontation with the settler state or are facing crises due to state and corporate practices of resource extraction and dispossession (2019, p. 442).

The literature indicates there was little to no accountability in the State Care services during the research period. Henwood (2015) highlights the lack of clarity around the core business of the Department of Social Welfare and what they were trying to deliver, and seemingly, no high-level overview of the department or of the children in its care. Further, Henwood reflects on the lack of expertise and skill, and the many social work failures. Furthermore, a participant in Moyle’s research (2013) notes:

CYF social workers are administrative and investigative social workers and lack life experience or the depth of knowledge to understand the gravity and impact of decisions on whānau. It’s like giving a very powerful tool to a child where it can quickly out of control (Whā interview, Moyle, 2013, p. 72).

Regulatory and auditing bodies such as the Social Workers Registration Board (SWRB), and Aotearoa New Zealand Association of Social Workers (ANZASW) are well established, however, deMontigny contends these associations are created ‘to ensure that the dominant paradigm is carried out in social work systems’ (deMontigny, 1995, p. 210). The struggle to find a place for Māori social work within a Eurocentric paradigm is evidenced throughout the literature. For example, in a 2002 paper, Leland Ruwhiu, the kaiwhakahaere of the Māori Caucus of the ANZASW at the time, discussed attending the national hui at Turangawaewae a Ngaruawahia in 1986 when the Tangata Whenua Caucus was first established.

The goal was then to move towards a state of autonomy as a Māori group of professional social work practitioners so as to mirror the realness of Te Tiriti o Waitangi for the social work profession in Aotearoa. Currently as the kaiwhakahaere of that Māori Caucus of ANZASW, that vision, although unachieved to date has never waned nor been far from the lips and hearts of Māori social workers with vision and foresight (Ruwhiu, 2002, p. 2).

Although Māori social workers were practising before the 1989 CYP&F Act, they were a scarce resource. Hollis (2006) argues that the visible face of Māori social work in Aotearoa New Zealand did not exist until after the new Act in 1989 which resulted in increased recruitment of Māori community workers and Mātua Whāngai workers who moved into Family Group Conference Coordinator positions. Many were never formally trained. In the Human Rights Commission report of 1992, it was noted that many social workers ‘have no idea about working with whānau’ (HRC, 1992, p. 97). The report like many others in the 1970s-1990s noted the lack of Māori in social work and clinical positions (Mason et al., 1988; HRC, 1992; MAU, 1985).

“Some Māori social workers played the game because it was a job, so they actually did what they had to do. Not all of us did (conform to) the rules, if you go back and see those of us that didn't, we didn't stay there long. We were out.”

– Māori Mātua Whāngai staff

“I used to look at the staff in the site that I worked in, and I'd say, ‘Now, if my grandchild were coming through here, who would I want to work with my grandchild?’ I could never find maybe more than one or two … some I would never want to work with my whānau, so, what does that tell you?”

- Pauline Tucker/Raewyn Bhana, non-Māori social workers

### Hierarchies within professional structures

The review of literature indicates the settler State Care sector was hierarchical and riddled with power dynamics that inhibited care. The literature describes power relationships within residential institutions in which DSW social workers shut Māori community workers out of cases, even when it was the community workers looking after the child (HRC, 1992). Sutherland (2020) gave an example of a psychologist from the United Kingdom in Owairaka Boys home in 1977, who made ethnocentric judgements in his reports such as mistaking whakamā for sullenness (p. 101). Māori staff in care positions could not challenge the assumptions made by more qualified staff. If staff including those in senior clinical positions spoke out about conditions within the residences, they were reprimanded by their Department (Sutherland, 2020, p. 107).

Being a Māori Social Worker in the research period was likely to have been very challenging given the Eurocentric structures and the power dynamics within the Department of Social Welfare.

### Māori positions

The Children and Young Persons Act (1989) fundamentally required social workers to consider the needs, values and beliefs of all ethnic groups, not only the majority (Bradley, 1995). With the introduction of the Act, more Māori staff were employed by CYPS in a drive to indigenise the Department (Tauri, 1999). Paid positions for Mātua Whāngai workers and for Māori advisory officers were created in some districts to provide a range of consultative services from translations to cultural training for staff (Baretta-Herman, 1990, p. 237). The spread of Māori staff in the DSW was described by the Māori Advisory Unit, as ‘pepper potting’, leaving Māori social work staff alone and unsupported (MAU, 1985, p27). MAU (1985) found the introduction of Mātua Whāngai left many Māori staff feeling as though ‘they are largely out on a limb from the rest of their colleagues’ (p. 11). The Advisory Unit recommend that Māori staff should be able to get together with other Māori staff, to support them in being Māori in the workplace (MAU, 1985, p. 17).

### Māori teams

Multidisciplinary child protection teams were created so Police, social workers, doctors and lawyers could provide advice to case workers. By the late 1980s, the department of social work was assisting more than 30 teams. Roopū Teams were introduced at CYPS with the specific goal of supporting Māori social workers and improving services for Māori children and their whānau. Māori social workers, within mainstream social service organisations, developed as a subgroup and supported the enhancement of each other’s methods (Hollis, 2006, p. 71). Cultural knowledge of tikanga (customs) Māori, te reo (the Māori language) and especially knowledge of Māori whānau, hapū and iwi in the geographical area they were working in was valued within these teams. Many Māori social workers in the early 1990s were employed because of these skills, and later obtained the appropriate social work qualification (Hollis, 2006).

“Our biggest challenge when we were in Social Welfare was to just be Māori.”

– Doug Hauraki, Māori senior public servant

According to Hollis (2006), Māori social workers described Roopū teams as an ideal structure for the use of Māori processes within CYFS. It allowed Māori social workers an environment where tikanga Māori was the norm, support from colleagues, and in many cases from a Māori manager, in accordance with the principles of te ao Māori (Hollis, 2006). Other benefits for Māori social workers included, not having to explain basic practices and methods used (to those who were unfamiliar with Māori processes), avoiding being the ‘token’ Māori, and dealing with organisational issues (such as institutional racism) as a group rather than on their own (Hollis, 2006, pp. 73-77). Māori Roopū, or units, were also at risk of being labelled ‘separatist or racist’ by the public and media (see Raea, 1990).

There was criticism of the management of Roopū teams, Rich (2003) noted they were overworked and under-resourced. Unsurprisingly, these criticisms were met by a government statement saying: ‘Roopū teams are well resourced and when there are high numbers of Māori children and families, caseloads are shared throughout the organisation’ (Rich, 2003, p. 1, cited in Hollis, 2006). There were little to no resources provided for Māori leadership supervision to keep Roopū teams supported and thriving (Love, 2002; O’Donoghue, 2003).

However, the issue of whether Roopū teams have been adequately resourced and managed is perhaps better answered by Māori social workers themselves. One participant in Hollis’ research described how there was a move in 2005 within CYFS to move some members of a Roopū team to a different location. The aim was to strengthen the Māori services within another branch of CYFS, but from the view of this participant, it would only weaken Māori services and deplete support for Māori staff through the Roopū team (Hollis, 2006 p. 36).

### Voluntary Māori staff

Throughout the decades there has been a reliance on volunteer staff to fill holes in the state machinery. MAU (1985) reported the volunteers, mainly Māori women who desired to help alleviate the plight of the Māori families, and who were relied on by DSW, had been ‘exploited by the Department of Social Welfare and other government agencies’, requiring them to assist paid staff (e.g., assisting in court, Mātua Whāngai, working with at risk children). They noted how the volunteers were not given the resources they urgently needed at times to effectively carry out these extra responsibilities. In many instances the volunteers had to use their own limited resources to give immediate relief to families in dire need. Consequently, volunteers found themselves financially, physically and mentally drained (MAU, 1985, p. 18).

“There was a time, if you saw two Māori people in an office, ‘Oh, it's a Māori unit’. And, if you saw two in a street, ‘well it's a gang’ It was that type of thinking.”

- Harry Walker, Māori public servant

The Mason report (1988) cites a hui at Rehua Marae, where Māori expressed concern that cultural knowledge, skills and experience were not valued.

There needs to be a change in the prerequisite for working with people. There is no way you can convince me that a 19-year-old nurse has any more clues than these two (refers to kuia) who have raised their families and grandchildren and worked on a limited budget. There must be ways we should be looking at in facilitating their access and working there. These kingdoms they are hierarchically structured, and they are made to block people out. Our people for years have been working with our people and doing a great job, but of course they come under stress because they are under resourced, and they are doing it for nothing. I am sure with people like this there must be ways we can make them feel more welcome in Sunnyside (Mason, Ryan & Bennett, 1988, Speaker at hui Rehua Marae, p. 166).

The literature indicates that while the State Care sector was heavily reliant on voluntary staff, the sector also marginalised, exploited and undervalued the work of volunteers. It is apparent that many volunteers within local communities were Māori who wanted to make a difference for Māori children.

## Training to work for the state

Appropriate training of staff working within the welfare sector has been identified as an issue since the first social workers were employed in the 1950’s. The first recognised social work training programme began in 1949-1950 with the introduction of the Post Graduate Diploma in Social Science offered through Victoria University in Wellington. In 1976, Massey University and University of Canterbury also established social work programmes.

The 1960s-1970s was a time of rapid growth for the profession of social work (Garlick, 2012). The New Zealand Association of Social Workers was founded in 1964 and joined the International Federation of Social Workers in the same year (Beddoe & Randal, 1994). At the time statutory and non-government workers were starting to identify themselves as social workers (e.g., child welfare officers, visiting teachers and probation officers), however, it was clear very few had formal training in the field (Nash, 2001). The development of professional social work practice was bolstered by an unprecedented emphasis on training, particularly following the creation of the Social Work Training Council (SWTC) in 1973.

In the 1960s and 70s, Tiromoana and Taranaki House social work residential training institutions were established by the Education Department, Child Welfare Division to meet a gap in social work training in the country. Mr Austin, Director at Tiromoana, gathered statistics in his position as director, as a member of the SWTC, and as Chief Advisory Social Worker of the Department of Health. According to his 1965 report: ‘Recruitment and Retention of Social Welfare Staff’, the statutory departments employed 291 field officers, and had 40 vacancies. Only 26 staff had a certificate of Qualification in Social Work, with or without a degree (Austin, 1965).

In 1967, McGregor, estimated that 16% of social workers employed by government agencies had a Dip. Soc. Sci. (VUW) or equivalent while 24% would probably have been through the course at Tiromoana (McGregor, 1967, p. 21). Austin & Buxton (1969) reported that, including those holding administrative appointments, there were about 700 social workers in statutory services and local bodies (hospitals and education boards). Of those approximately 15% held a professional qualification. Possibly a further 45% had attended professional courses at Tiromoana or other short courses, additionally, others held university degrees, not always in social sciences (Austin & Buxton, 1969 p. 5).

In 1975, the DSW extended its in-house training: in addition to the residential training centre at Kohitere, they assumed control of the Tiromoana Social Work Training Centre from the State Services Commission. While between 1972 and 1975, the number of social workers increased by nearly one- third, the additional staff were primarily directed towards areas of understaffing, or to manage core statutory responsibilities under the new Act (Nash, 2001, p. 93).

It appears that while Māori may have been recruited into the service, they were not able to access the training at the same levels of Pākehā. While the literature suggests Māori were targeted for recruitment, they were often underqualified (Hollis, 2006). Given qualifications were used to recruit into leadership positions within the sector, limited access to training served to further marginalise Māori within the system. Māori were over-represented in clerical, voluntary and caregiver positions ensuring they had little to no authority or ability to influence from within the system.

### Cultural training for non-Māori professionals in the sector

In their review of training, WARAG (1984) noted none of the internal courses related specifically to racism and none of the course outlines mentioned racism. In external formal training centres like Taranaki House, around half the course descriptions noted the issue of racism (WARAG, 1984). The regional supervisor training had only recently been amended to include modules on social work and racism, as well as communication and cultural systems. The WARAG report noted the institutional racism evident in training:

* All staff trainers in training institutions are Pākehā.
* The venues for staff training reflect Pākehā values (seating, food, environment).
* Programmes of training are formulated and conducted by Pākehā.
* Focus is often on a student/teacher relationship rather than collective sharing.
* Māori and Pacific staff are expected to conform to Pākehā styles of teaching and learning e.g., Māori participants at a course on Community Development at Tiromoana were not welcomed in Māori, there was little or no reference to issues of racism, and they were not included in the process of planning the course (WARAG, 1984, p. 32).

Puao-te-Ata-Tū made two specific recommendations dedicated to staff and training not only for Māori staff, but also front-line non-Māori staff who lacked ‘awareness of Maori culture and New Zealand history’ (MAC and Rangihau, 1986, p. 22). The tenth recommendation of Puao-te-Ata-Tū, concerned staff training, acknowledging that the DSW needed to take urgent steps to improve training performance in all areas of work. The committee recommended the DSW, in consultation with the Department of Māori Affairs, should identify suitable people to institute training programmes to provide a Māori perspective for training directly related to the needs of the Māori people (MAC and Rangihau, 1986, p. 40). Further, they recommended a review of tertiary social work courses which they found did not meet the cultural needs of the DSW.

A comprehensive report ‘Training for newly appointed social workers in residential care’ (July 1982) addressed the selection and training of new residential social workers (Parker, 2006). However, the recommendations made to DSW Head Office did not include the issue of racism. Furthermore, the ‘cross cultural issue’ is referred to in only one of the 10 proposed training modules. Indeed, the training research literature, not only overlooks the importance of training Māori, but also omits references to Māori social worker training and to Māori as trainers for non-Māori professionals.

“We would be the cultural trainers. The Māori staff, you carry your own job and then you were the ones that were asked to do this on top of our job. It wasn't formal cultural training. We were just sitting in training where we might be and then we end up giving advice from a cultural perspective … often our colleagues would come along and come and ask us something. We go to give an answer, but they never actually stopped to listen to the whole answer, they think they've got it in the first few words and off they go.”

- Te Inupo Farrar, Māori Mātua Whāngai and DSW social worker

The lack of training for non-Māori staff within the sector not only placed the onerous task of upskilling colleagues on to existing Māori staff, but it also ensured that institutional racism, as noted in the 1980s reviews, continued unchecked and unchallenged. Additionally, the HRC (1992) reported that DSW staff had not received any training relating to the issues raised in the Puao-te-Ata-Tū report (p. 168).

### Marginalisation of Māori within training programmes

There are varying accounts regarding the nature of the cultural content within training programmes (Staniforth, 2015; Nash, 1999). However, at best, it is apparent that the curriculum post Puao-te-Ata- Tū was designed to expose Pākehā to Te Tiriti and te ao Māori, rather than support and extend the professional learning and development of Māori Welfare Officers/Social Workers. Staniforth (2015) investigated historical and participant recollections of the training experiences at Tiromoana and Taranaki House and found the content related to te ao Māori or a Māori worldview was limited, particularly in the early years. Her findings reiterated Nash’s PhD thesis (1999). In an interview with Tom Austin, the Director of Tirimoana, Nash asked about Māori content in the early years of Tiromoana. Austin recounted, ‘that they always tried to have at least one or two Māori Welfare Officers in each course, but it was very much a Pākehā oriented programme’ (Nash, 1999 p. 223).

Staniforth (2015) reported that in the late 1970s, training programmes began to explore racism and started to develop bicultural awareness. Māori trainers were recruited to run these sessions. In her analysis Stainforth reflects that ‘for many of the Pākehā participants, this appeared to be both a confronting and sometimes painful experience, but also a very valuable one’ (p. 224). Staniforth’s focus was on the Pākehā experience of learning about the Treaty with no mention of how marginalised Māori might have felt being part of these training programmes, particularly when some of the Pākehā staff took offence to the content and walked out of the room (p. 224).

In the mid-1980s, Nicola Atwool became the Director of Tiromoana House until it closed in 1988. This was around the time of Puao-te-Ata-Tū. She notes how the report had an impact on the training programmes, shifting to include bicultural content, establishing a Māori caucus and the inclusion of kaumātua, such as, Titewhai Harawira (Staniforth, 2015).

Judge Brown’s Ministerial Review of the DSW (2000) expressed concerns about the professionalism of social workers in terms of the issues of training, qualification, and supervision. He noted that in 1988 the Government responded to the Mason Review and made the statement that ‘by the year 2000, 90% of social work staff (would) have a professional [CQSW or level B] qualification, with an endorsement to indicate competence in CYP Service social work practice’.[[2]](#footnote-3) Jenny Shipley, as Minister of Social Welfare, stated in the introduction: ‘The total upskilling of the New Zealand Children and Young Persons Service to be undertaken over the next few years will provide the impetus for higher quality service’ (Brown, 2000).

Brown (2000) noted the fact that only 44% of front line staff and only 55% of new recruits have a B level social work qualification was ‘a sad indictment of the 1990s’. In its submission, CYF openly acknowledges the difficulties of recruitment, especially to outlying sites due to the low pay scales, and the complex and stressful nature of the work (Brown, 2000). Concern about this state of affairs was expressed in many of the submissions, as shown in this example:

“An inadequately trained professional is if anything worse than an amateur, because of the power invested in their professional status” (Quote from a stakeholder in the Brown Report, 2000).

For decades Māori community and stakeholders in the system have asked for qualifications to be interpreted broadly. Life experience, fluency in te reo Māori and ability to relate to another cultural group should be accepted as qualifications for certain positions and be recognised in classification, salary and pay grading. However, the lack of recognition of cultural and community capability resulted in Māori skills being used by the system without remuneration. In addition, the preference to train Pākehā and exclude Māori as well as failing to provide training for non-Māori to raise awareness of racism, biculturalism, and Māori preferences and practices, meant that DSW training perpetuated racism within the system for at least 40 years. Furthermore, this continues to be an issue. The Grassroots Voices report highlighted the challenges for Māori practitioners to be resourced for training towards qualifications and professional registration (NZCCSS, 2009).

There is evidence of under-provision of appropriate training for Māori across the State Care sector. The Mason Report identified the lack of trained Māori professionals in the psychiatric sector as a concern, as was the absence of any significant Māori input into training programmes or other issues which clearly warranted a Māori perspective (Mason et al., 1988, p. 165). In addition, ongoing appropriate in- service training was lacking for Māori, and in 1985, it was noted that appropriate cultural supervision was not a reality for Māori social workers (Mataira, 1985). Even with the later establishment of Māori for Māori (Roopū) teams within CYPS, there were little, or no resources provided for Māori supervision or leadership to keep these Roopū teams supported and thriving (Love, 2002, & O’Donoghue, 2003). This lack of kaupapa Māori supervision and leadership is a continuing deficiency in social services (O’Donoghue, 2003), that limits the development of Māori social work and critical Māori programmes in care and protection (Hollis-English, 2012).

“Where we thought we could (help) people was in the enlightened people, the 70% odd of the staff, who went according to which way the wind blew, and so we built all of our cultural capability into them, but the moment Ann Hercus resigned, they just flipped back to their default position.”

- Doug Hauraki, Māori senior public servant

“I had to learn these concepts; you know this person-centered counselling. I said ‘well how the hell you do that if his family is over there’ ... And they said, ‘we won't have that tone in here thank you very much’.”

– Daniel Mataki, Māori family home parent

“For Māori staff … I think it was pretty tough … the department had run its own training, it started to pull back on that. I think the impact on them (Māori staff) was burn out. It was exhausting. They had to deal with this huge mass of people who needed support. People got very tired. I think for Māori staff, it's worse because they've got a double accountability, especially if they're working in their own rohe.”

- Non-Māori senior social worker

## Working within the resources distributed by the state

There is significant literature documenting the under resourcing of the State Care sector by the Crown throughout the research period (Garlick, 2012; Mason et al., 1988). In particular, there are a range of inquiries into psychiatric care between the 1970s and 1990s that identify ‘critical short-staffing’ as having a significant impact on the level of care provided to patients within institutions (Mason et al., 1988; Diesfeld, 2012). Within an under-resourced sector, the lack of bicultural capability and capacity is a serious issue that has been demonstrated in multiple studies over several decades (Garlick, 2012; Mason et al., 1988; Brown, 2000; HRC, 1992; Sutherland, 2020).

The 1990 Public Finance Act triggered an era of significant fiscal constraints for the DSW. From 1991 to 1994, there was a 50% increase in child abuse notifications which was astoundingly accompanied by a 10% reduction in the DSW budget (Garlick, 2012). The first General Manager of CYPS, Robyn Wilson, was noted as saying:

Funding is so tied to the Act. I’ll say this, and I don’t know that anyone will believe it, but I swear to you it’s true; that the Treasury actually suggested to us, because we couldn’t manage our budget, that we should actually do fewer child abuse investigations … that’s just unbelievable (Dalley, 1998a, p. 361).

The lack of Māori capacity within the system has meant Māori staff have often had unrealistic expectations placed upon them. An example was described in the 1988 Mason report into psychiatric services. The Wellington Hospital board has appointed a Māori Health Coordinator. One of her duties is to develop bicultural service in the region administered by the board, this is an enormous task which, without further support, appears impossible (Mason et al., 1998, p. 168). These constraints fed by under-resourcing within the care sector, has resulted in a serious detrimental impact for Māori staff rippling through the sector.

Judge Brown (2000) led The Ministerial Review of the Department of Child, Youth and Family and found that staff workload and capacity had been a continuous issue for the sector for three decades. Brown noted that complaints by staff most commonly concerned:

* A perception of a service seriously under resourced.
* A demoralised workforce.
* Variation in skill levels.
* Disproportionately inexperienced staff.
* Inadequately supervised and supported staff.
* Serious difficulties with both recruitment and retention of social workers.

(Brown, 2000, p. 24)

“I survived because I loved young people, loved children and loved people. I just treated them as if they were mine. I believed in who I was as a Māori woman and where I came from, it was my strength. I walked in both worlds.”

- Te Inupo Farrar, Māori Mātua Whāngai and DSW social worker

Further, Brown (2000) mentioned that staff, from many regions, reported they were incapable of handling the workloads in a professional manner and resulting in reactive crisis driven social work and a frontline staff which may at times be exposed to elements of ‘professional dangerousness’ (Brown, 2000, p. 25). High workload, stress and under- resourcing resulted in high staff turnover in the State Care sector.

The Human Rights Commission study into children and young people in out of family care (1992) found that underfunding was the single biggest issue; often funding was insufficient to run the children’s home or vehicles. The funding was confirmed as being ‘inadequate for meeting the needs of the supervisors for the children to be fed and clothed and to finance programmes’ (p. 96). Furthermore, Māori interviewed for the report spoke of a funding discrepancy between Māori and Pākehā groups.

“If you’re Pākehā and a Christian you’ll get funding, anything that is Māori will get nothing” (Māori participant cited in HRC, 1992, p. 89).

While Māori and iwi providers saw Puao-te-Ata- Tū as a potential pathway to actualisation of Tino- rangatiratanga aspirations, the new system was subsumed by managerialism, and international welfare developments and trends (Tauri, 2009). Moyle (2013) found the lack of Māori practitioners in social services limited the growth of essential Māori initiatives, programmes and culturally progressive working environments (Moyle, 2013 p. 20). In addition, the economic reforms of the late 1980s and 1990s led to the budget for care and protection being significantly decreased (Levine, 2000; Waldergrave & Coy, 2005; Connolly, 2006).

The economic reforms, and resistance to pro- Māori initiatives, starved iwi social services, Māori social workers and family group conferencing of the potential to fully develop (Sorrenson, 1996; Love, 2002 & Pakura, 2003). The consequential failure of Māori initiatives shifted the financial burden for care of children from the state to whānau, magnifying the distress experienced by already depleted whānau (Cram, 2011; Stanley & de Froideville, 2020).

## Working in policies and programmes designed by the state

Policy development in Aotearoa New Zealand as discussed in previous sections of this report, has been based on the drive to assimilate Māori, thus, increasing Māori dependency on the system (Hill, 2009). This top-down approach evident between 1950 and 1999, has had significant impacts on the Māori staff who worked in the public sector. Acknowledging the lack of latitude provided for Māori staff to influence policy, hearing their voice in policy development and implementation, is paramount to understanding their experience of working in the public sector during this time period.

In 1977, Duncan MacIntyre, the Minister of Māori Affairs, authorised the State Services Commission (SSC) to conduct a survey of the Department of Māori Affairs. The survey, conducted by Deputy State Services Commissioner, Kara Puketapu, found the department’s Welfare Division embodied a ‘paternalistic centralised bureaucracy’ removed from its clients’ ‘cultural and developmental needs’. He recommended the development of policies promoting ‘greater community participation and autonomy’ (Hill, 2009, p. 198). Even after Puketapu was appointed as Secretary of Māori Affairs in 1977, the SSC struggled to grapple with the movement from assimilationist policies toward tino rangatiratanga (Workman, 2017).

MAU (1986) reported that the DSW had deliberately excluded Māori from participating in policy development and decision-making by privileging educational qualifications. They stated, ‘Māori participation in policy and decision-making has been almost non-existent, another bureaucratic characteristic being the emphasis on technical qualification as a criterion for entry level into the organisation, this disqualifying most Māori people’ (p. 11). This was exemplified by the selection panel requirements for the working group reviewing the Children and Young Persons Act. Māori were not selected as working party members but were invited as consultants, despite the fact that the major group affected by the Act comprised of Māori young people. MAU proclaimed that this must not continue. ‘Maori input has been non-existent as Māori have had to conform and fit into the system’ (MAU, 1986, p. 16).

Although some mechanisms to consult with Māori staff and practitioners were in place, they did not include the sign off of policy development (WARAG, 1985). Historically, the political discourse resulted in confusion amongst Māori and government agencies, inferring that policy-making, for and on behalf of Māori, was assumed by the crown (Bean, 2018).

Perhaps this is best evidenced in Te Punga (1994), the DSW’s response to Puao-te-Ata-Tū. Te Punga intended to operationalise Puao-te-Ata-Tū, however for many it was confirmation that the ‘light of dawn in terms of what had been envisaged by Māori would never really reach whānau, hapū and iwi’ (Taki, 1996; Bradley, 1995). The Human Rights Commission (1992) found that while ‘it was the intention of the Act to empower whānau, hapū and iwi, Department policies worked instead to disempower them’ (p. 167). Further, there was a concern that every DSW office had autonomous power to use or ignore Puao-te-Ata-Tū, so each office was left to decide the extent to which the recommendations would inform office practice (HRC, 1992, p. 168). Sorrenson (1996) found that structural reform and policy confusion within the CYPF were pivotal to disadvantaging Māori.

Since the release of Puao-te-Ata-Tū , policies and practice have not addressed the dynamics of power, rather the attempts of change in the name of partnership or biculturalism appear to have preserved the ultimate power of Pākehā (Sorrenson, 1996, p. 114). Top-down policy development permits state appropriation of Māori cultural practice to support Eurocentric policy construction (Moyle, n.d.a). It also empowers policymakers and academics to absolve themselves of responsibility for ineffective and inappropriate policies and interventions (Moyle & Tauri, 2016). Indeed, research indicates that the lack of consultation with Māori social workers continues on proposed policy or legislation changes and how these might specifically impact upon practice and outcomes for whānau (Moyle, 2013).

“I actually think that I prefer policy being formed as a result of practice.”

– Harry Walker, Māori public servant

“We ran anti-racism workshops. We got banned from the Department of Social Welfare office in Christchurch. Some of the staff down there invited us, so we went down to the Christchurch office. Spent a week training down there. And, on the Friday when we're leaving the guy who actually banned us was in the lift. He didn't know we were in his office for a week.”

– Harry Walker, Māori public servant

### The Family Group Conference

The Family Group Conference (FGC) was formalised as an official and legal process in the 1989 CYPF Act. It was inspired by the whānau hui, a traditional problem-solving method, family decision-making, for Māori (Love, 2000). The practice that informed the design of the FGC emerged in 1986 from the Lower Hutt District Office, working with the Māori Development Unit of the Head Office, alongside other regionally Māori whānau based models (Walker, 2021).

For the very offices that had introduced whānau/ family decision-making into their practice from 1986, the transition in 1989 was reasonably seamless and welcome, as the paradigm shift had already happened. However, for the majority of offices where the paradigm shift had not occurred, they were starting from a paradigm that was pathologically focussed (Walker, 2021).

The original ‘family decision-making model’ morphed considerably into what was adopted as the Family Group Conference. The vision for the FGC process was that ‘the state would stand aside, and family, whānau, and where invited, hapū, iwi and family groups, would be given responsibility and power to make decisions’ (in the first instance), supported by professional advice (Becroft, 2017). FGCs were an attempt to be culturally appropriate for Māori in emulating a whānau hui (extended family meeting) model in which whānau meet collectively to hear the concerns of the state. However, most often whānau felt forced, rather than invited, to the hui as they feared their children would be taken (Moyle, n.d.b).

Becroft (2017) found that FGC practices were inconsistent, resourcing was generally inadequate, there was insufficient whānau and wider family present and insufficient consideration to identifying and inviting hapū and iwi to attend. In addition, Moyle found the FGC was being used to forward the social workers’ agenda, as social workers often cultivated a predetermined outcome for whānau (Moyle, 2013). Several Māori researchers found the FGC process to be an attempt by the state to Indigenise childcare and protection and youth justice through the co-option of Māori cultural practices (Love, 2002; Moyle, 2013; Tauri, 1998; Walker, 2000). The issues included:

* A lack of cultural responsiveness and capability, by non-Māori professionals which created barriers for whānau to attain positive outcomes (Moyle, 2014; Rimene, 1994).
* Discretionary powers were being used by practitioners to vet whānau decisions (Rimene, 1994).
* FGCs were poorly arranged because practitioners were unable to network with whānau (Rimene, 1994).
* Although whānau were involved, they had no control over the process (Rimene, 1994).
* Non-Māori practitioners manipulated the process and the outcome to reflect their perceptions of the best interests of the child (Rimene, 1994; Moyle, 2014).
* Māori were referred to FGC without first exploring lesser interventions (Moyle, 2013).
* The FGC process was used as a way to formalise an ongoing role for the state in monitoring whānau (Moyle, 2014).
* The FGC was culturally inappropriate and disempowering as ‘enforcement based’ rather than strengths- based’ (Moyle, 2014).

The issues for whānau around FGCs largely stem from insufficient resourcing, as well as lack of culturally competent practice and self-determination for Māori (Moyle, 2013). Further, assessment and intervention programmes stemming from FGCs were often imported and inappropriate for Māori. Risk assessment tools, such as the Manitoba Risk Estimation System, were introduced to assess potential risk not actual risk and were used as justification for uplifting Māori children (Moyle n.d.a). Several researchers describe instances where tools/programmes were renamed with a Māori name to the make the tool more culturally marketable to Māori practitioners and participants (Moyle, 2013).

## Marginalisation of kaupapa Māori research and programmes

Māori social work practices were further constrained by the lack of investment in Māori specific research and the privileging of Eurocentric ‘evidenced- based’ practice and policy development. Moyle (2013) found the most concerning challenge Māori practitioners experience in care and protection was the lack of research on the topic (Moyle, 2013). Recently, Came and colleagues (2019) claimed there is a distrust of Māori and Pacific evidence and expertise which is kind of how the cultural racism plays out. Racism arises from the privileging of biomedical Western evidence over Indigenous knowledge. There are numerous examples in research literature which describe Māori responses within the State Care sector as insufficiently funded to build an evidence base to support sustainability and continued practice (Carr & Peters, 1997; Love, 2002; Libesman, 2004; HRC, 1992).

This omission in research extends to policy formation and development. Moewaka Barnes (2009) asserts that government institutions (including science as an epistemological practice) are not culturally neutral in their appraisal of evidence in the formation of policy. There is substantial evidence that demonstrates Māori research was excluded from policy making decisions within the sector for the period of 1950- 1999 (MAU, 1988; WARAG, 1985). The experiences of many of the world’s Indigenous peoples can attest to the devastating and dehumanising impact seemingly ‘objective’ researchers have had on their traditional cultures (see Bishop & Glynn, 2003; Cram, 2001; Smith, 1999; Spoonley, 1993).

“There were attempts to influence the FGC, we were reasonably successful, one of the important parts of the legislation was that private family time, we got that in it. But, what we didn't want was the power of veto to be left with the social worker. That's what's still with the state. So, while the private family time was a part where people could exercise their own power ... the power of veto rested with the social worker.”

– Harry Walker, Māori public servant

“For us, it was this new way of working was recognising that families had the ability to make decisions and keep children safe.”

– Harry Walker, Māori public servant

It is evident that when whānau were engaged in research, they were very suspicious of research by the state. The Human Rights Commission (1992) found that whānau were highly critical of ongoing research without seeing any changes in the Department of Social Welfare. Further, their report noted that many of the ‘programmes or therapies’ that Māori children in out of family care placements experienced were not Māori, rather it was assumed that they would be appropriate, there were no guidelines or expectations about what was considered culturally appropriate (HRC 1992).

The lack of support to build research evidence in the State Care sector ‘by Māori for Māori’ has had detrimental impacts in terms of the opportunities for Māori staff and the experiences of Māori in the system.

## The experiences of Māori staff working in the State Care sector

Analysis of staff data for the research period indicates that Māori wanted to work in the State Care sector with whānau, in their own communities (SSC, 1989). The HRC (1992) reported that many Māori went to work with DSW because they wanted to try to help make it work better for Māori people, however, jobs and policies were set up to entice Māori away from their original goal of helping their people (p. 169). Recent research into Māori working in the State Care sector demonstrates that Māori continue to work in the sector to try to make a difference for Māori in their communities. Haar (2019) gives examples of this through quotes from two Māori working in the State Care sector:

“There is a thing for Māori and Pacific peoples here in the sector – we are here to do and make change for our communities. Many of our communities are dependent on these departments and people want to help their people” (2019, p. 18).

“[The reason I like working here is] that I can affect great change for Māori within the public sector. I know what I am good at and enjoy the public- people interface. I really enjoy the challenge! I enjoy delivering for Māori and New Zealand as a whole. [This enjoyment has increased] because New Zealand has moved from ‘grievance mode’ to ‘growth mode’ for Māori” (2019, p. 18).

The most significant empirical research in the area of Māori staff experiences in the sector is found in research conducted by Māori practitioners and academics. Notably, Sorrenson, (1996), Hollis (2006), Hollis-English (2012) and Moyle, (2013) who investigated Māori social workers’ and managers’ experiences working in NGOs and government departments concerned with State Care. While much of this research was conducted outside the time frame within this review, the Māori social workers who were interviewed all referenced their experiences of the changes in the system with the introduction of Puao-te-Ata-Tū and the CYPF Act. The fact there is so little evidence about how Māori staff experienced the care sector prior to 1999 reflects the low value placed on Māori staff in the sector by the government, as well as the lack of empowerment of Māori to research and publish during this period. The Māori Advisory Unit report into DSW Māori staff in 1985 was one of the very few exceptions.

This section examined the evidence relating to the experiences of Māori social workers working in the State Care sector.

## The impact of marginalisation of Māori in the workforce

Evidence in the previous sections demonstrated how Māori have been marginalised in the State Care sector workforce since its establishment.

An example of how marginalisation plays out and impacts staff is presented in a communication between Māori staff in senior management positions and J. W. Grant, the Chief Executive of the DSW, in 1989. Māori staff at the head office wrote to the Executive Management Group expressing their concerns over the lack of progress implementing Puao-te-Ata-Tū. Eighteen senior Māori staff signed the letter which stated:

The organisational environment has been such that Māori perspective has had only a limited part to play in the political organisational and structural agenda of the department. The ease with which Māori opinion can be ignored is a particular source of dissatisfaction for Māori staff (Letter to Executive Management Group, 28 March 1989).

They noted eight specific concerns which included:

* imbalance of numbers of Māori and Pākehā staff in Head Office, Regional District Office that needed to be addressed and;
* the knowledge that a number of Māori managers in the department who had sought promotion had been unsuccessful (Letter to Executive Management Group, 28 March 1989).

The letter suggested two recommendations for the Executive Management Group, which included specific responses to the eight issues identified. The Chief Executive Officer, responded the day after with a letter, expressing his disappointment stating, ‘I for sure shall not be discouraged by your challenge, and that … I am not going to fight Māori staff whose eyes should be with mine on the horizon and not at our feet (Letter from J. W. Grant, 29 March 1989).

This written interaction is one of many cited by researchers, and described in interviews with Māori staff, demonstrating how Māori staff have raised concerns over the years only to be dismissed by senior management. The impact of such marginalisation within the DSW was the near impossibility to drive change from within.

“I was very, very isolated (as a social worker) except for the fact that I had this beautiful kaumātua group around me. People often said, ‘Oh, why did you stay in the department for 37 years?’ Well, when kaumātua tell you that this is my upbringing, you have to stay there, and that's actually what happened.”

- Te Inupo Farrar, Māori Mātua Whāngai and DSW social worker

“We called a Māori staff meeting and we invited the Director General to come, he came, did his thing and then went. After he went, a lot of our thoughts started to crystallize, and we wrote a letter to him, thanking him for taking the time, but just pointing out that in that short visit, these four, five things were what we wanted to raise, this is the challenge about Puao-te-Ata-Tū. There were only about three or four of us who signed that letter. The rest of the Māori staff wouldn't. So, for me, that was bullshit.”

– Doug Hauraki, Māori senior public servant

### Lower Hutt Māori units 1990

The othering of Māori staff during this period is further highlighted in a high-profile media interaction between the Social Welfare Minister, Dr Cullen; the Chief Executive, J.W. Grant; and senior Māori staff. In July 1990, a draft report which suggested a separate Māori social work unit and job tagging for Māori staff in the Lower Hutt Office was leaked to media. The Dominion Sunday Times printed the text of the draft report about ‘tagging’ Māori vacancies for Māori people to rectify the clear imbalance between the staff composition and the client population (Raea, 1990). Subsequently, 14 newspapers across Aotearoa New Zealand printed stories describing the units as privileging treatment, operating a colour bar, and separatist racial policies (Department of Psychology, University of Waikato, 1990, p. 4). In newspaper articles Dr Cullen is quoted stating,

Racial favouritism for social worker positions within the Social Welfare Department would not be tolerated and I do not agree with separate units of that sort. A social work unit directed towards culturalism which is not the same thing as a liberal version of apartheid, which is what things will amount to if we continue down this separatist path.

(Cited in Department of Psychology, 1990, p. 14).

In an analysis of the media representation, at a departmental seminar at Waikato University, the psychology department noted the use of separation. They describe this as casting an unnecessary and destructive challenge to the standard reading of racial history, a Pākehā understanding, that we are all (uniformally and primarily) citizens of one country, (and this) minimised the importance of cultural differences. They note the editorial comments about divisiveness and how the Dominion and other papers exemplified the process of separatism and compared this with their analysis that,

There is a great deal of evidence that our colonial processes are not working, especially not for Māori. The inadequacy of subsuming such diverse skills as language, cultural competence, commitment to Māoritanga etc. under the wishy-washy nation of cultural sensitivity is like saying doctors will be more human if we just improve their communication skills (Department of Psychology, University of Waikato, 1990, p. 16).

The media interaction is an example of how despite attempts to implement and design responses for Māori, staff were often hamstrung by political resistance. The analysis by the Department of Psychology at Waikato University noted that:

None of the media responses addressed key aspects of Puao-te-Ata-Tū, that the Pākehā ways of running the department and the (predominantly Pākehā) staff do not work effectively for a significant group of legitimate recipients…. It is likely that an important reason for such failure is that the Pākehā staff and institutions are interacting with clients in terms of Pākehā common sense. Māori workers in the settings are constantly being socialised to respond in the same way unless they work in a kaupapa Māori context, this is a self- sustaining cycle of interpretation and interaction (Department of Psychology, University of Waikato, 1990, p. 13).

There is evidence of separatist language used when Māori attempt to implement change in the Department in numerous documents, under the guise of bi-culturalism.

These examples demonstrate how the lack of Māori within organisations like the Department of Social Welfare left Māori practitioners exposed to institutional isolation and rendering them vulnerable to both the organisation and the community (Moyle, 2013, p. 20). The lack of Māori within the DSW, and the workforce distribution of Māori through ‘pepper potting’, left Māori vulnerable and unable to make change within their own workplaces.

Came et al. (2019) investigated how Māori leaders in health services experience marginalisation. Participants in their research described how their knowledge and interests were devalued and they experienced racism and tokenistic engagement.

Some indicated it took considerable effort to establish credibility, be heard, have impact, and navigate advisory meetings, but even then, their inputs were marginalised. Marginalisation in the workforce limits the ability of Māori leaders to influence and make changes within the organisation.

Moyle (2013) noted the lack of Māori practitioners brings with it a plethora of other challenges such as the competition between agencies to employ Māori staff. The impact of marginalisation in the workforce is described in the literature as Māori staff having to leave their ‘Māoriness’ at home, experiencing burnout, with the additional expectation that they will support and enculturate non-Māori staff within the sector. In addition, there have never been enough Māori social workers to match the over- representation of whānau Māori in the system (Hollis-English, 2012).

## Māori staff had to leave their ‘Māoriness’ at home

For the entire period of this research Māori staff have worked in an environment that was riddled with institutional racism. This was first acknowledged in the 1980s by the MAU and WARAG reports, and again recently by Grainne Moss in her statement to the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Waitangi Tribunal, 2020).

In the 1980s the Māori Advisory Unit, described how Māori staff members talked about leaving their ‘Māoriness at home when they went to work’, returning at the end of the day to put it back on. The MAU stated, ‘being Māori should be considered an asset, not a hindrance to one’s work and opportunities within the Department’ (MAU, 1985, p. 13). Conversely, Māori staff were often used to provide advice on Māoritanga however, their knowledge, skill and ability went unrecognised and unrewarded. The report argued that such knowledge and experience should be considered a specialist qualification.

The Māori Advisory Unit noted particular strains were placed on Māori staff members because they were Māori (1985, p. 17). They experienced feelings of conflict because their attitude towards clients was judged as being ‘not professional’, one of ‘over involvement’, or ‘too personal’, observing that Māori staff could not disguise their concern for people who looked to them for assistance. The advisors noted:

The only alternative for Māori staff was ‘to fit into the system’ and forsake their ‘Māoriness’, thereby hopefully reducing their strains, eliminating ‘feelings’ of conflict within themselves and those real feelings of isolation because they are Māori and have a different approach to clients (MAU, 1985, p. 17).

“The shit hit the fan when somebody in another office complained about what was going on (Māori units), the newspaper got it … I’ll just say one of the things I was most proud about was the controversy took the Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait off the front page of The Evening Post. This kind of attack on a squinky little bloody Māori unit … talking about soft apartheid.”

- Harry Walker, Māori public servant

## Māori staff worked with dual expectations

Document analysis from the research period demonstrates Māori public servants have had to manage the dual expectations of the Māori community and the public sector. In many cases Māori public servants, although they are not responsible, nor have the power, are the ones who ‘front up’, and would feel the brunt of Māori dissatisfaction with government (Hollis-English, 2015). Hollis-English (2015) observes that this may be a legacy from the previous Māori Affairs regimes of Tu Tangata and the Kōkiri process, whereby ‘fronting up’ to the Māori community is embedded as part of the sector approach. Moyle (2013) asserts:

‘Having to battle a system from within’ is a role that consumes enormous energy and can limit vision. It can leave the social worker vulnerable to both the organisation and the community. This position leaves Māori workers exposed to being individually demonised and labelled by institutional representatives as incompetent or unprofessional if we do not conform to institutional mores (Moyle, 2013, p. 6).

The Human Rights Commission (1992) report on ‘out of family care’ noted, that ‘Māori were very concerned about the effects that Crown management had on Māori people working in Crown agencies’ (p. 117).

Boston and Gill, (2011) argue the critical observation is that ‘Māori public servants attended to both roles, as principals and stewards, and tried to do the best they could’ (p. 237). Some found themselves walking in two worlds, negotiating governance arrangements that included both ‘hard’ factors, such as, structure, rules, processes, and mandate, and ‘soft’ factors, such as, people and relationships (p. 237). Love (2002) notes that unlike many of their non-Māori social work counterparts, Māori practitioners face the dual burden of professional and cultural expectations within the organisation as well as from the communities. Moyle (2013) describes this dual accountability as like ‘walking the tightrope between two worldviews whilst at the same time managing their own personal and professional identity’ (p. 4). There has no doubt been a personal toll on many Māori who have worked in the State Care sector, many may not have been able to meet expectations or were seen by either of the parties as not meeting their expectations.

Love (2002) reflected:

One of the side effects of the co-option of Māori into the current statutory regime has been that many of the social activities of the 1970s and 1980s has become the social service providers of the new millennium ... Māori workers are employed for their Māori knowledge and standing but pressured into conforming to institutional mores that are in conflict with tikanga Māori. This is particularly problematic for workers who have come from iwi of Māori community practice, where the trust of their communities and their standing among these people are pivotal to their successful work (Love 2002, p. 30).

On the other hand, Māori workers perceived as conforming to the norms within statutory welfare systems, may be viewed by their whānau, hapū, iwi and communities; ‘as brown faces doing the dirty work that was previously done by white social workers … the challenge they face is being over- worked and yet undervalued or worse invisible’ (Love, 2002, p. 32). This perception of Māori public servants is noted by researchers, practitioners and the government (Love, 2002; Moyle, 2013; SSC, 1998).

“We weren't always popular because we were identified with the government. I've been told to, ‘F off,’ on a number of occasions. ‘Stealing the land. You turn up with the car, ah Fuck off’. It's just the way it was, eh? And you said, ‘Oh well, whatever. I'll come back bro when you're in a better mood’.”

- Harry Walker, Māori public servant

In 1998, the State Services Commission acknowledged that Māori recruitment problems are linked to the perception that Māori joining the Public Service have ‘sold out’ (SSC, 1998, p. 3). Cribb’s (2005) research found that public servants could be, or at least could be perceived to be, operating as principals with a monitoring focus and treated as agents of the state. It was the government that usually decided what work needed to be done with Māori, rather the contracted NGO. Some Māori working for NGOs felt like they ended up doing the work of the state, so becoming agents of the state (Hollis-English, 2015).

## Māori staff experienced burn-out

Since the 1950s the State Care sector has been underfunded and operating in a state of crisis particularly through the 1970s, ‘80s and ‘90s. Staff were recorded as being so stretched they were constantly responding to crisis events (Garlick, 2012). The literature indicates this is more evident for Māori staff. Hollis-English (2012) refers to this as ‘brown face burnout’. Brown face burnout has two important components; first it is about Māori social workers being over worked and generally unhappy about their workload, the second burnout is associated with their ethnicity, being Māori’ (Hollis- English, 2012). Burnout and high turnover of Māori social workers further results in a drain of Māori knowledge within organisations (Connolly, 2006; Hollis-English, 2012; Pakura, 2005).

While the department introduced Roopū teams and other initiatives to support Māori staff, these were underfunded, and in some cases served to isolate Māori further. The findings support Moyle’s contention that ‘Māori social workers are undervalued and ill rewarded for their cultural and professional expertise and their contributions to social work in development of care and protection’ (Moyle, 2013, p. 22).

“You become isolated in your profession, because you're seen as a tokenistic complicit guy because you're guilty by association, by being in the organisation, by your own whānau. You're damned if you do, damned if you don't. That wasn't covered off, from a cultural safety point of view, by managers or any of them. They had no comprehension of that. They didn't understand complexities of why that was happening.”

– Shane Graham, Māori social worker

## Māori staff worked in a context of tokenistic biculturalism

The call for biculturalism in government in the 1980s saw many agencies appropriate Māori cultural symbols and rituals, but in such a way that they did not impede on their core functions (Workman, 2012). Workman describes this period as when ‘the ‘dial- a-kaumātua’ industry was born’ (2017 p. 169). This was followed by the examination of their structural arrangements, staffing and human resource policies. Some departments committed to increasing the level of Māori staffing and Māori development. They also set out to enculturate Pākehā staff on Treaty issues and tikanga Māori, however, this was often left up to individual Māori staff within public service departments.

Māori staff are often referred to in the literature, as being in the unenviable position of being responsible for enculturating the system without the resources, capability or capacity required to make the expected change (Gardiner & Parata, 1998).

Several Māori researchers/practitioners have argued that many of those working in youth justice and child protection sectors lack the necessary working knowledge of Māori cultural perspectives to enable them to work as bicultural practitioners, despite being ‘professionally approved’ as culturally competent (Moyle, 2013, 2014; Love 2000; Rimene, 1994). Both Moyle and Hollis found that Māori social workers were often placed in a position where they had to educate their colleagues (Moyle, 2013, Hollis, 2006, Hollis-English, 2015). Hollis (2006) highlighted that it should not be the responsibility of Māori practitioners to compensate the lack of culturally competent practice in care and protection (Hollis, 2006). However, Māori social workers are often taking on the role of educating colleagues and are overworked as a result of the added responsibilities (Hollis-English, 2015).

In her study of seven Māori social workers, Moyle (2013) found that Māori practitioners were constantly having to compensate for the lack of bicultural capability in the care and protection system. They provided this support to their colleagues in addition to completing their own casework. Despite this extra responsibility, they felt undervalued. This lack of recognition and reward for their cultural and professional expertise takes its toll, which also goes unnoticed thus exacerbating the harm caused over time.

Hollis-English (2015) and Moyle (2013) discovered that Māori social workers found working with non- Māori colleagues a major challenge, particularly when non-Māori colleagues questioned the use of Māori processes, due to ignorance, disagreement or disapproval. For Māori practitioners everything they do begins and is underpinned by their values and beliefs (Moyle, 2013). Working within a sector that is institutionally racist means Māori staff are constantly at odds with the values and beliefs that are privileged and accepted as normal.

## Māori staff choosing working outside state agencies

Māori social workers in government organisations lament the lack of organisational support for Māori practices (Hollis- English, 2015, p. 220). Hollis-English (2015) found Māori social workers working for the government gave very few positive comments about their employer and many mentioned the feeling of being under surveillance and being restricted by organisational policies.

Many significant developments for Māori social work have originated within NGOs because of their openness in allowing staff, particularly Māori staff, to be flexible and creative. NGOs which provide supplementary, complementary and primary services to the public under government contracts can be innovative and flexible, protect particular interests, promote voluntary citizen participation, and attend to needs which are not met by the government (Slack & Leung-Wai, 2007).

Hollis (2006) demonstrated how Māori social workers’ experiences within non-government organisations varied. Some found working for a community-based organisation particularly difficult for Māori social workers, especially if their employer relied heavily on them to undertake the implementation of tīkanga in the workplace, whereas other organisations attempted to create culturally supportive atmospheres. Similar to government organisations, Māori social workers were concerned about Māori positions being disestablished. Furthermore, they felt that non-government organisations should be wary of becoming tokenistic in their implementation of tīkanga Māori (Hollis-English, 2015, p. 221).

“You just sort of, you just say, 'Well, I don't actually need that. I'm not going to be in a place which doesn't understand. It's not my job to educate everyone.' Surely, it's the system's job to do that.”

– Shane Graham, Māori social worker

In contrast, Hollis-English (2012) found that Māori social workers within Māori and iwi-based organisations reported predominantly positive workplace experiences. They described supportive environments that used Māori processes to guide their work including having access to cultural advisors, kaumātua and kuia (female elders). Additionally, the whānau had access to their knowledgebase and support, and it was common practice to use tīkanga through pōwhiri, poroporoaki and hui. Karakia and reo were also commonly being used in Māori organisations as well as other tools/concepts, such as: kanohi-ki-te-kanohi, whanaungatanga, tautoko and ā te wā. Their management was supportive and knowledgeable about te ao Māori and regular training in Māori models of practice were provided. When asked for suggestions of how Māori organisations could improve, their responses revolved around relationships and communication with other organisations. Māori social workers felt that better relationships would enhance the use of resources and improve the referral process for Māori whānau (Hollis-English, 2012, p. 164).

Boulton (2005) found that Māori health providers deliver services at the interface between two philosophical viewpoints or worldviews. Firstly, for the Māori community in which they are located and to whom they provide the services, and secondly for the funder from whom they obtain resources to enable them to deliver services. As a consequence of working at the interface, Māori providers regularly and routinely work outside the scope of their contracts to deliver mental health services which are aligned with those values and norms enshrined in Māori culture (p. ii).

“I worked alongside one great “Māori practitioner, he often became disheartened and traumatised with efforts to move his case work to whānau based. In the end he left, running an NGO, … that over the years has gone from strength to strength.”

– Pauline Tucker, non-Māori social worker/Raewyn Nordstrom, Māori social worker

## Māori staff developed kaupapa social work practices

The introduction of Puao-te-Ata-Tū brought about significant changes for Māori social workers and contributed significantly to the development of Māori social work practices (Hollis, 2006). Māori practitioners have contributed a great deal to the development of Māori social work in Aotearoa New Zealand (Hollis-English, 2006; 2012). Several Māori practitioners and academics have specifically addressed the topic of Māori social work, describing how Māori social work practitioners have, despite resistance, established methods underpinned by Māori theories (Bradley, 1995; Connolly, 2001; Eketone, 2004; Ruwhiu, 2002, 1999; Walsh-Tapiata, 2003, 1997; Walker, 2001; Hollis-English, 2012; Moyle, 2013). Indigenous practitioners play an essential role in defining problems and developing solutions for indigenous communities (Hollis- English, 2012).

A variety of theoretical approaches influencing Māori social work practice have developed over the past 50 years (Hollis, 2006). ‘Tikanga Māori such as whakawhanaungatanga, wairuatanga (spirituality) and aroha, all fundamental aspects of Māori social work methods, are vital to their relationship with clients and also their approach in the organisational environment’ (Hollis, 2006, p. 86). Research identifies the lack of support for Māori social workers to develop specific cultural knowledge in order to continue critically integrating concepts of identity, theory and tikanga into practice (Moyle, 2013; Moyle, n.d.a). Hollis-English, (2012) maintains that investment in training would allow indigenous practitioners to work in culturally appropriate and informed ways with indigenous families, without the pressure to conform to non-indigenous theoretical discourse.

However, some Māori social workers implementing Māori models of practice experienced constraints. Hollis (2006) found that while Māori workers were permitted to use Māori processes and initiatives, it was only within the boundaries and protocols of the organisation and therefore, they were restricted in implementing practices based on tikanga (Hollis, 2006). Similarly, Moyle (2013) found that inclusion of

Māori protocols within the family group conference (FGC) process was in many cases done in a tokenistic manner, and that much of the success of the FGC was dependent on the social worker’s ability to engage with the family. This was particularly hard for Māori social workers as they were being asked to use some Māori methods of practice, but within a restricted environment (Hollis-English, 2012, p. 66).

## Māori staff were resistant

In the 1970s and 1980s, Māori staff protests about the treatment and placement of Māori in the State Care sector became more evident (Sutherland, 2020). Māori staff gave evidence to the ACORD public inquiry on the treatment of children within residential homes (Sutherland, 2020, p. 93). Workman (2017) noted that Māori widely regarded government bureaucracy as culturally biased, and for Māori, working in the public service during this time, it was threatening and unpleasant. Internally, Māori public service staff were ‘calling out’ the public service for how they positioned Māori within the Crown agencies (Workman, 2017).

A good example of such ‘calling out’ is found in a speech entitled ‘Cultural Imperialism and the Māori: The Role of the Public Servant’ delivered by Donna Awatere, at a national hui at Waahi, chaired by Peter Boag (Deputy Chair of the SSC) on ‘The Public Service in a Multicultural Society’. Awatere challenged cultural imperialism, arguing that ‘Māoritanga has displayed extraordinary cultural resistance to imperialism’ and that the basic interests of the Public Service and the Māori are diametrically opposed’ (Awatere, 1982, p. 2). She asserts:

The number of Māori who are willing to wear the legacy of spiritual courage and to go within the imperial stronghold, the public service and strike some blows for Māori sovereignty is small. The Service itself forces Māori people to live a schizoid existence. To hang our Māoriness outside the office door. To wait like pets for changes that don’t come. Sneaking our Māori side in occasionally and holding our breath. But basically, forced to be content with the magician’s tricks, half believing that reform and change are not fallacious; illusions which make us feel we are the house pets we are (Awatere, 1982, p. 4).

“We did things that weren't acceptable to the bureaucracy, but we did them … we wrote about how to put Puao-te-Ata-Tū into practice, so when excreta hit the fan, it was at a public hui down here at Waiwhetū, where all these booklets that we wrote were held up as the best things since sliced bread, but the bosses, the bureaucracy's response to that was, ‘Who the hell did this? Find out how many of these things are left?’ Then with with great gusto, we said, ‘Oh no, there's about 4,000 of these booklets. They're all over the country,’ ... and then they turned out to be some of the best blooming practice booklets.”

– Doug Hauraki, Māori senior public servant

She concludes:

The harsh reality is that the Service forces us to crawl on our knees hobbling to the tunes of those who laugh and dance beside the opening grave of Māoritanga singing empty tunes of multiculturalism.

The task ahead of the Public Service to pave the way for biculturalism require it to examine closely how the existing economic, political and social relationships support the powerful vested interests of those who benefit from white hegemony. This is a big job, one that requires an end to self-serving cross-eyed myopia which promotes multiculturalism dressed up in brown faces with a haka skirt mentality (Awatere, 1982, p. 4).

Concern about the issue of conflict between Māori and Pākehā dominated the discussion at Waahi, and a prevailing view developed that progress could not be made with the concerns of other cultural groups until government had dealt with the unfinished business between Māori and Pākehā (Workman, 2017). Agreement was reached within the public sector that multiculturalism would first be approached through what became known as the ‘bicultural imperative’, with public servants expected to develop bicultural awareness and sensitivity (Workman, 2017). Harris (2007) describes biculturalism as ‘the magic stopper that would keep the racial tension genie in the bottle, but it too was problematic. Biculturalism required cultural effort from Pākehā – acceptance of Māoritanga – and it was probably unacceptable to many Pākehā’ (p. 17). Evidence suggests biculturalism was never achieved across the Department of Social Welfare or CYPS (Sorrenson, 1996; Moyle, 2013; Love., 2002).

During our interviews, there were numerous instances where Māori staff described efforts to change or resist the actions of the state. Letters to Department of Social Welfare senior management throughout the 1980s and 1990s were cited which complained of inaction particularly following Puao- te-Ata-Tū, a lack of funding for Māori initiatives such as Mātua Whāngai and concerns that Māori initiatives were tokenistic and unsupported in regional offices. Being a ‘squeaky wheel’ in the machinery of government did not go without a personal cost. Several interviewees spoke about being made redundant, being reprimanded for whistle blowing, having to take time out due to personal stress and realising that they had compromised their career opportunities for being seen as disagreeable in relation to the intentions of the state.

“What I realised was that the changes that I wanted were unlikely to happen in my lifetime, and it didn't matter. The fact that you've got the courage to carry on, that's all you can do … it doesn't matter if you fail because to me, at that time, the major impediment was ambition. If you're ambitious, you'd tell lies to get to where you need to be. So, if you're not ambitious, you can tell the truth and say to yourself, 'Well, suck up.' You could be ambitious or have integrity but not both, so that when I abandoned all ambition just to cope.”

- Tā Kim Workman, Māori senior public servant

“We were constrained, if I can call it that, by the public service ... there was a public service code of conduct. It was forbidden for us to criticise another government department., I breached it … I'd call people racist within the department and gave examples of it. I'd speak openly with people ... then I get hauled up and so I’d say, 'Yes I did it'.”

- Harry Walker, Māori senior public servant

## Discussion and summary

This chapter described the challenges Māori staff have faced working for the state sector, particularly in welfare departments during the research period. The metaphor of a machine was used to provide a structure to demonstrate how the mechanisms of the state have led to the Māori staff experiences reported in research. At all levels of the machinery of government, from grassroots working with the community, to regional offices, to senior management positions, staff have felt, at the very least, compromised by the state machinery.

The mechanisms of the state have been noted in this chapter as being; the marginalisation of Māori staff, inequitable employment practices, lack of opportunities particularly leadership, and the instability of the constantly changing employment context. Māori staff, during the research period, were employed in institutions designed by the state, such as residential homes, special schools and psychiatric institutions. In these contexts, they were employed in roles defined by the state inherited from colonial structures and colonial understandings of the ‘social welfare and the social worker’. These roles were monitored, endorsed and assessed through professional structures, such as the documenting of roles and professional association memberships. Māori were prepared for these roles by training organisations founded on colonial social welfare concepts. Once cultural training began in the 1970s, it tended to focus on exposing non-Māori social workers to cultural content rather than upskilling Māori staff.

Māori staff were expected to work for the state within a resource constrained environment, most often noted as being insufficient to particularly meet needs for Māori initiatives. Māori staff were tasked with implementing programmes that were designed by state. Valued programmes that emerged from Māori practice, such as family decision-making, were captured by the state and morphed into a legal process, like the Family Group Conference.

The impact of the machinery of the state, was that Māori staff had to leave their Māoriness at home and conform to the Pākehā hegemony within the workplace. Practitioners worked with dual expectations, the expectations of their own community, and those of the state, but often expected to privilege the desires of the state over their own community and relationships. Māori staff reporting ‘brown burnout’, often chose to work outside the state in non-government organisations.

While Māori staff have worked within this context, they have developed their own practices and own theoretical approaches. They have been able to articulate their own approach to kaupapa Māori social work and engage in personal research and development. In our research, there was substantial evidence that Māori staff were resistant to changes that they believed did not reflect the intention of the Treaty of Waitangi or Puao-te-Ata-Tū and voiced their concerns to senior managers. They described themselves as the squeaky wheel in the machine, realising their resistance compromised their career opportunities and ambitions within the sector.

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1. During the voyage of the Arawa waka, Kearoa, the wife of Ngātoro-i-rangi, had been insulted by Tama-te-kapua. So, Ngātoro-i- rangi called upon a storm to drive the Arawa into Te Korokoro o Te Parata (The throat of Te Parata), a mid-ocean whirlpool. It was only when the shrieks of the women and children moved his heart with pity that he Ngātoro-i-rangi relented, and let the canoe emerge safely. <https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Ng%C4%81toro-i-rangi> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. The government’s response to the Report of the Ministerial Review Team 1992 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)